

## The Geoeconomic Case for U.S. Investment in Mongolian Copper

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### Abstract

*China has a chokehold on global supply chains of critical minerals that presents a national security threat to the United States. This was a deliberate strategy to cultivate dominance since the 1990s. Following the example of Japan, the United States should strongly consider investing in Mongolian copper to regain strategic autonomy in this area.*

*Mongolia has a difficult geographic position as a buffer state between Russia and China. As a hedge, it has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy for strategic balancing, with Washington being an important partner. Although the United States has no vital interests in Inner Asia, it should still pursue commercial relations in the region, since it is strategically important as the confluence of the Chinese and Russian spheres of influence.*

*Mongolia's most productive economic sector is mining, having one of the world's largest copper mines. Copper will take on increasing economic importance in coming decades due to the high demand generated by the AI revolution. The United States is a net importer of refined copper.*

*Mongolian copper has lower extraction costs, and the ore is of higher quality, than that of Chile and Canada, currently the main sources of foreign copper for the United States. But there are geopolitical risks to investing in Mongolia because of its rough neighborhood. The case of the expropriation of a Canadian uranium mine underscores them.*

*There are reasons to remain optimistic. Mongolia is a healthy democracy. If paired with investment in domestic refining capacity, investments in Mongolian copper could be insulated from Chinese influence and could open up a viable, second transportation route through Russia.*

**Keywords:** Critical minerals, Copper mining, Geopolitics, Supply chain security, Third-neighbor policy

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
### Introduction

The United States and China have entered a period of heightened strategic competition in every domain and region. In some sectors, Washington maintains an edge, such as semiconductors, while Beijing has the upper hand in others. One of the strongest tools of economic statecraft at China's disposal is its dominance of global supply chains of "critical minerals" and "rare-earth elements" (REE).

Both terms are frequently used interchangeably, as they broadly refer to materials

found in the ground, which must be processed in order to power much of modern technology. However, it is important to define terms properly at the outset. A *critical mineral* is “a mineral or element...that is declared by the U.S. government to be necessary for the production of nationally important technologies and is difficult to source, especially because of its rarity or location.”<sup>1</sup> REEs are a subset comprising 17 metallic elements that are chemically complex and difficult to process.<sup>2</sup>

Figure 1. Critical Minerals the U.S. Needs China For. (Visual Capitalist)



The U.S. Geological Survey has 60 entries in its critical minerals list.<sup>3</sup> China dominates the production of at least 30 of those (see Figure 1),<sup>4</sup> but this was not always the case. The United States used to lead world production of rare-earth oxides until the mid-1990s (see Figure 2),<sup>5</sup> when Chinese production skyrocketed. This was no accident: Deng Xiaop-

<sup>1</sup> “CRITICAL MINERAL Definition & Meaning | Dictionary.Com,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/critical-mineral>.

<sup>2</sup> *Rare Earth vs Critical Minerals: 7 Key Facts You Need*, Investing in Rare Earths, May 14, 2025, <https://rareearthexchange.com/rare-earth-vs-critical-minerals/>.


<sup>3</sup> “Interior Department Releases Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals | U.S. Geological Survey,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://www.usgs.gov/news/science-snippet/interior-department-releases-final-2025-list-critical-minerals>.

<sup>4</sup> Marcus Lu, “China Dominates the Supply of U.S. Critical Minerals List,” *Visual Capitalist*, January 8, 2024, <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/china-dominates-supply-of-u-s-critical-minerals-list/>.

<sup>5</sup> “China’s Power over Rare Earths Is Not as Great as It Seems,” *The Economist*, n.d., accessed December 18, 2025, [https://www.economist.com/interactive/briefing/2025/08/13/chinas-power-over-rare-earths-is-not-as-great-as-it-seems?utm\\_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm\\_source=google&ppccampaignID=19495686130&ppcadID=&utm\\_cam-](https://www.economist.com/interactive/briefing/2025/08/13/chinas-power-over-rare-earths-is-not-as-great-as-it-seems?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=19495686130&ppcadID=&utm_cam-)

ing is famously quoted as saying “The Middle East has oil, China has rare-earths” in 1992.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, U.S. production declined as “free-market policies, globalization trends, and environmental constraints pushed capital away from US projects.”<sup>7</sup>

**Figure 2. Production of rare-earth oxides 1950-2024. (The Economist)**



However, that trend has started to reverse due to deliberate policy moves from U.S. lawmakers. The United States can and should follow Japan’s successful playbook<sup>8</sup> to regain critical minerals independence from China. This paper argues that investment in Mongolian copper can play an important part in this strategy. It investigates the economic and political factors involved at some length.

### Mongolia’s Geopolitical Context

Mongolia is a country located in North Asia between Russia and China. Its foreign relations are framed by its geographic dependence on its neighbors, as it is landlocked, has a small population and little arable land.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, Mongolia’s continued existence as an independent state is partly the result of Russia’s and China’s desire for a buffer zone between them,<sup>10</sup> as relations between both countries have historically fluctuated, even leading

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<sup>6</sup> Harry Saunders, “How a Deng Xiaoping Quote Became China Watchers’ Favorite Anecdote,” *Domino Theory*, November 12, 2025, <https://dominotheory.com/how-a-deng-xiaoping-quote-became-china-watchers-favorite-anecdote/>.

<sup>7</sup> *Why the US Fails to Secure Critical Mineral Supply — and How It Can Be Fixed - The Oregon Group - Critical Minerals and Energy Intelligence*, Investment Insights, September 30, 2025, <https://theoregongroup.com/investment-insights/why-the-us-fails-to-secure-critical-mineral-supply-and-how-it-can-be-fixed/>.

<sup>8</sup> River Akira Davis and Kiuko Notoya, Reporting from Tokyo, “How Japan Built a Rare-Earth Supply Chain Without China,” *Business, The New York Times*, December 8, 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/08/business/japan-rare-earths-lynas.html>.

<sup>9</sup> “Mongolia - Livestock, Herding, Grazing | Britannica,” December 13, 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Mongolia/Agriculture-forestry-and-fishing>.

<sup>10</sup> Altantuya Dashnyam, “Small States’ Security And Foreign Policy: A Case Study Of Mongolian Permanent Neutral Sta-

to serious border clashes in the 1960s.<sup>11</sup> Paradoxically, this distrust is actually a stabilizing force for Mongolia's continued independence as both sides have an incentive to maintain the status quo.

In light of this, Mongolia has maintained functional neutrality in international politics as a survival strategy since the 1990 democratic transition.<sup>12</sup> This is reflected in its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.<sup>13</sup> Cognizant of its precarious position, it has also pursued a "Third-Neighbor Policy" to cultivate relations with other countries.<sup>14</sup> Naturally, relations with Washington are an important source of economic growth and strategic balancing for Ulaanbaatar. The United States is an important trading partner to Mongolia, being its sixth largest export market and fifth largest source of imports in 2024.<sup>15</sup>

Yet it is difficult to argue that the United States should get more involved in Inner Asia amid general international retrenchment and the second Trump administration's Western-hemispheric turn.<sup>16</sup> Even before this recent shift in global politics, the United States had little business in that part of the world. The Global War on Terror was a freak occurrence that demanded unusual American attention in the region. While Russia and China were initially cooperative in counterterrorism matters since they were threatened by radical Islamic terrorism as well, eventually they resented the American military presence in their backyard.<sup>17</sup> What all this means for Mongolia is that Afghanistan taught the United States that its best strategy in the region is one of 'less is more', which in the main means engaging in commerce.

Indeed, lacking *vital* interests in a region does not mean having *no* interests. As American foreign policy embraces traditional geopolitics anew, Mackinder's lesson that he "Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island/Who rules the World-Island commands the World"<sup>18</sup> remains useful today. Mongolia, being in Mackinder's Heartland, then, cannot be entirely ignored. It has many valuable rocks.

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tus," *European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences* Political Science, International Relations and Sociology-ic-PSIRS 2018 (September 2018), <https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.03.02.10>.

<sup>11</sup> Miles Maochun Yu, "The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts As A Key Turning Point Of The Cold War," Hoover Institution, December 13, 2022, <https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war>.

<sup>12</sup> Jaehyuk Jang and Kisun Kim, "Mongolia Becoming a Permanent Neutral Nation? Focusing on the Debate and Challenges of the Permanent Neutral Nation Policy," *The Pacific Review* 37, no. 3 (May 2024): 504–32, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2184853>.

<sup>13</sup> "Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status | United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones," accessed December 18, 2025, <https://www.un.org/nwzfz/content/mongolias-nuclear-weapon-free-status>.

<sup>14</sup> Antonio Graceffo, "Mongolia's 'Third Neighbor': Balancing between China, Russia, and the U.S.," *Geopolitical Monitor*, August 28, 2024, <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/mongolias-third-neighbor-finding-balance-between-china-russia-and-the-u-s/>.

<sup>15</sup> *Mongolia – Trade Information Portal*, n.d., accessed December 18, 2025, <https://trade.carecprogram.org/country-statistics/goods/mongolia/>.


<sup>16</sup> President of the United States, "National Security Strategy," White House, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> Akhilesh Pillalamarri, "The United States Just Closed Its Last Base in Central Asia," *The Diplomat*, accessed December 19, 2025, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-united-states-just-closed-its-last-base-in-central-asia/>.

<sup>18</sup> Halford John Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (Cosimo Classics, 2020).

The Mongolian economy’s largest sector is mining, accounting for 29% of GDP and employing 6% of workers in 2023.<sup>19</sup> The country has “extensive deposits of coal, copper, fluorite, gold, iron, rare earths, tungsten, uranium, and zinc.” An overview of Mongolia’s mineral reserves and potential is shown in Figure 3.<sup>20</sup>

**Figure 3. Minerals potential of Mongolia**  
(Ministry of Mining & Heavy Industry of Mongolia)



It has 69.9 million tons of proven copper reserves,<sup>21</sup> representing about 0.58% of the world’s total estimated reserves of 1.2 billion tons.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, deposits are well distributed throughout the country, as seen in Figure 4.<sup>23</sup> This is beneficial in that potential mining activity can occur near major population centers, yet logistically difficult given Mongolia’s geographic extent and lackluster infrastructure development; a World Bank report notes “the poor condition of transport infrastructure in Mongolia, which is nearly nonexistent


<sup>19</sup> Jaewon Chung, *The Mineral Industry of Mongolia*, 2023 Minerals Yearbook (U.S. Geological Survey, 2025), <https://pubs.usgs.gov/myb/vol3/2023/myb3-2023-mongolia.pdf>.  
<sup>20</sup> Ministry of Mining & Heavy Industry of Mongolia, “Investment Potential In The Minerals Sector of Mongolia,” October 2022, <https://mmhi.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/IMARC1-2.pdf>. Slide 5.  
<sup>21</sup> Ministry of Mining & Heavy Industry of Mongolia, “Investment Potential In The Minerals Sector of Mongolia.” Slide 5.  
<sup>22</sup> *Copper Reserves By Country 2025: Global Impact Summary*, Mining, August 29, 2025, <https://farmonaut.com/mining/copper-reserves-by-country-2025-global-impact-summary>.  
<sup>23</sup> Ministry of Mining & Heavy Industry of Mongolia, “Investment Potential In The Minerals Sector of Mongolia.” Slide 6.



compared with the rest of world.”<sup>24</sup> Despite this, copper mining is a vibrant industry, hosting Oyu Tolgoi, projected to become the world’s fourth largest copper mine by 2030.<sup>25</sup>

**Figure 4. Location map of copper deposits and occurrences in Mongolia.**

**Case Study: Mongolian Vs. Chilean Vs. Canadian Copper**



Copper is cheap and found all over the world.<sup>26</sup> Yet it is classified as critical because its high conductivity of heat and electricity makes it indispensable in many technologies.<sup>27</sup> The AI revolution will only increase copper’s criticality due to the big electrification needs of data centers in coming decades.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, many other critical minerals are often produced as by-products of copper production “including tellurium, arsenic, antimony, gallium, indium, cobalt, platinum group metals, and bismuth.”<sup>29</sup>

The United States is simultaneously a net exporter and importer of copper: it imports half of its refined copper needs, mostly from Chile and Canada, and exports copper scrap, mostly to China.<sup>30</sup> For a full understanding of the potential economic opportunity, it is

<sup>24</sup> “Mongolian InfraSAP: Infrastructure for Connectivity and Economic Diversification,” The World Bank Group, November 2020, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/460711593758757501/pdf/Mongolia-InfraSAP-Infrastructure-for-Connectivity-and-Economic-Diversification.pdf>. Page 7.

<sup>25</sup> Amrida G., “Oyu Tolgoi To Become the World’s Fourth Largest Copper Mine,” Montsame, March 21, 2025, <https://www.montsame.mn/en/read/364655>.

<sup>26</sup> “Global Copper Map | U.S. Geological Survey,” July 13, 2016, <https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/global-copper-map-0>.

<sup>27</sup> “Copper as a Critical Mineral,” Society for Mining, Metallurgy & Exploration, accessed December 19, 2025, <https://www.smenet.org/what-we-do/technical-briefings/copper-as-a-critical-mineral>.

<sup>28</sup> Polina Devitt, Pratima Desai, and Polina Devitt, “How Tight Supply, AI Demand Propelled Copper towards \$12,000,” Business, *Reuters*, December 12, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/business/how-tight-supply-ai-demand-propelled-copper-towards-12000-2025-12-12/>.

<sup>29</sup> Society for Mining, Metallurgy & Exploration, “Copper as a Critical Mineral.”

<sup>30</sup> “President Trump Orders Probe into Copper Imports,” Benchmark Source, February 27, 2025, <https://source.benchmark->

necessary to compare the costs of copper extraction in Mongolia to that of other countries. Chile is a useful baseline for comparison because it is the world's largest copper producer, while Canada's proximity to and good relations with the United States present low geo-economic risk for business.

The standard cost metric in copper mining is *C1 cash costs* (expressed in U.S. dollars per pound of copper produced), which are “direct costs, which include costs incurred in mining and processing (labor, power, reagents, materials) plus local G&A, freight and realization and selling costs. Any by-product revenue is credited against costs at this stage.”<sup>31</sup>

For Oyu Tolgoi in Mongolia, the Q1'22 C1 cash costs were USD \$1.66/lb.<sup>32</sup> CODELCO, the Chilean state-owned mining company and the largest copper mining company in the world, reported 2024 C1 cash costs of USD \$1.99/lb,<sup>33</sup> a 19.9% higher cost. Closer to the United States, Capstone Copper, a Canadian mining company, reported 2024 C1 cash costs of USD \$2.56/lb,<sup>34</sup> a 54% higher cost. These are snapshots in time of costs that fluctuate, but Mongolian copper has a rather low-cost curve (in 2014, Oyu Tolgoi's C1 cash costs were USD \$1.14/lb). Mongolian copper has a relatively high amount of gold by-product, which offsets costs.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, the ore grade at Oyu Tolgoi, defined as the concentration of the target mineral in natural ore, is relatively high at 1.96%.<sup>36</sup> A higher ore grade means lower refining costs to obtain a given amount of the target mineral. For comparison, CODELCO's ore grade is 0.6%, more than two thirds lower,<sup>37</sup> while Capstone Copper's is 0.79%.<sup>38</sup>

However, Mongolian copper is not without downsides in other respects. A key factor in the variability of extraction costs is energy. 95% of Mongolian petroleum imports come from Russia.<sup>39</sup> This presents long-term geopolitical risk for potential American investors given the present uncertain trajectory of relations between Washington and Moscow. This dependency would not even have to be intentionally weaponized for it to have a negative impact: in “April 2011, Russia cut its diesel supply to Mongolia because of shortages in its

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minerals.com/article/president-trump-orders-probe-into-copper-imports.

<sup>31</sup> “C1 Costs,” *QuotedData*, n.d., accessed December 18, 2025, <https://quoteddata.com/glossary/c1-costs/>.

<sup>32</sup> “Turquoise Hill Announces Financial Results and Review of Operations for the First Quarter Of 2022,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220510005070/en/Turquoise-Hill-Announces-Financial-Results-and-Review-of-Operations-for-the-First-Quarter-Of-2022>.

<sup>33</sup> “December 2024 Results,” CODELCO, March 28, 2025, [https://www.codelco.com/sites/site/docs/20240426/20240426181050/operational\\_and\\_financial\\_report\\_december\\_31\\_2024.pdf](https://www.codelco.com/sites/site/docs/20240426/20240426181050/operational_and_financial_report_december_31_2024.pdf). Page 2.

<sup>34</sup> Capstone Copper, “Capstone Copper Reports Fourth Quarter 2024 Results,” *Capstone Copper*, February 19, 2025, <https://capstonecopper.com/news/capstone-copper-reports-fourth-quarter-2024-results/>.

<sup>35</sup> “Oyu Tolgoi,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://www.riotinto.com/en/mn/oyu-tolgoi>.

<sup>36</sup> Oyu Tolgoi, “Press Release – Q4 2024 Performance Results,” January 31, 2025, <https://www.ot.mn/en/news/press-release-q4-2024-performance-results>.

<sup>37</sup> CODELCO, “CODELCO AT A GLANCE,” March 31, 2025, [https://www.codelco.com/prontus\\_codelco/site/docs/20200531/20200531230507/codelco\\_at\\_a\\_glance\\_march\\_31\\_2025.pdf](https://www.codelco.com/prontus_codelco/site/docs/20200531/20200531230507/codelco_at_a_glance_march_31_2025.pdf).

<sup>38</sup> Capstone Copper, “Capstone Copper Reports Fourth Quarter 2024 Results,” *Capstone Copper*, February 19, 2025, <https://capstonecopper.com/news/capstone-copper-reports-fourth-quarter-2024-results/>.

<sup>39</sup> “Mongolia May Turn to China for Gasoline after Russian Import Ban,” *Azernews.Az*, October 6, 2025, <https://www.azernews.az/region/248447.html>.

domestic supply which drove up costs of mining operations and logistics.”<sup>40</sup> Interestingly, although the United States imports little refined copper from China because of tariffs,<sup>41</sup> all of Mongolia’s copper concentrate is refined in China due to a lack of domestic refining capacity.<sup>42</sup> This represents another pressure point exploitable by U.S. adversaries.

For Canadian mining company Khan Resources, this was not unfounded alarmism. The company had taken over a uranium deposit in the 1990s. In 2009, a feasibility study showed mining to be viable at the site.<sup>43</sup> Shortly after, the Mongolian government revoked the firm’s operating license and handed control over to the Russians, who are reported to have “called in some favors and pressured Ulaanbaatar to secure access to key natural resource reserves.”<sup>44</sup>

Additionally, while Chile faces high energy costs itself,<sup>45</sup> it has one of the world’s longest coastlines with open sea access, while Mongolia is landlocked. The United States’ relations with Mongolia’s two neighbors make any investment in Mongolia risky. Canada, being the closest country to the United States culturally, presents many intangible and logistical benefits for long-term investments.

<sup>40</sup> “Mongolia and the New Russian Oil Diplomacy,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://www.ifimes.org/en/researches/mongolia-and-the-new-russian-oil-diplomacy/3937>.

<sup>41</sup> Benchmark Source, “President Trump Orders Probe into Copper Imports.”

<sup>42</sup> *Copper – Mongolia Inc*, n.d., accessed December 18, 2025, <https://mongoliainc.com/key-commodities/copper/>.


<sup>43</sup> “Mongolia’s Meddling in Mining Operations Will Cost It \$100 Million | Kluwer Arbitration Blog,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/mongolias-meddling-in-mining-operations-will-cost-it-100-million/>, 2025, <https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/mongolias-meddling-in-mining-operations-will-cost-it-100-million/>,”plainCitation”:“Mongolia’s Meddling in Mining Operations Will Cost It \$100 Million | Kluwer Arbitration Blog,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/mongolias-meddling-in-mining-operations-will-cost-it-100-million/>,”noteIndex”:41,”citationItems”:[{“id”:930,”uris”:[“http://zotero.org/users/13256014/items/48EQDQV5”],“itemData”:{“id”:930,”type”:“webpage”,“abstract”：“The Mongolian government has recently been required to pay one Canadian mining company approximately \$100 million for expropriating that company’s uranium extraction licences in 2009. This sum is payable to Khan Resources Inc (Khan

<sup>44</sup> Postmedia News, “Khan Resources Asks Ottawa to Stop Mongolian Aid Pending Settlement for Mine given to Russians,” Financial Post, March 2, 2016, <https://financialpost.com/commodities/energy/khan-resources-asks-ottawa-to-withhold-mongolian-aid-pending-settlement-for-mine-given-to-russians>,”container-title”:“Financial Post”,“language”:“en”,“title”:“Khan Resources asks Ottawa to stop Mongolian aid pending settlement for mine given to Russians”,“URL”:“https://financialpost.com/commodities/energy/khan-resources-asks-ottawa-to-withhold-mongolian-aid-pending-settlement-for-mine-given-to-russians”,“author”:[{“literal”:“Postmedia News”}],“accessed”:{“date-parts”:[["2025",12,18]]},“issued”:{“date-parts”:[["2016",3,2]]}},“schema”：“https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}

<sup>45</sup> “Chile Copper Mining Costs Highest in Americas, Threatening New Investment, Report Says,” *MINING.COM*, December 15, 2025, <https://www.mining.com/web/chile-copper-mining-costs-highest-in-americas-threatening-new-investment-report-says/>.



Figure 5. Asia Democracy Map (Economist Intelligence Unit)



Yet on balance, there are reasons to be optimistic about investing in Mongolian copper. First, the country boasts one of the strongest democracies in a Eurasian Sea of authoritarianism (see Figure 5),<sup>46</sup> which can provide a good foundation for a stable business environment. That said, the five Central Asian republics have worse democracy scores than Mongolia yet have seen more success in attracting American investments recently, and overall, have seen more economic growth since the collapse of communism than Mongolia.<sup>47</sup>

Kazakhstan’s 2025 GDP per capita is projected to top Russia’s and China’s, poised to reach USD \$14,770, compared to \$14,260 and \$13,690 respectively.<sup>48</sup> In 1995, it stood at \$1,061.48,<sup>49</sup> which represented 39.82% of Russia’s \$2,665.80.<sup>50</sup> This is an astonishing

<sup>46</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2023* (2023).  
<sup>47</sup> “US-Central Asia Gathering Yields Deals | Eurasianet,” accessed December 18, 2025, <https://eurasianet.org/us-central-asia-gathering-yields-deals>.  
<sup>48</sup> Dmitry Pokidaev, *Kazakhstan Tops Central Asia for GDP per Capita, Surpassing Russia and China - The Times Of Central Asia*, Central Asia, August 15, 2025, <https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-tops-central-asia-in-gdp-per-capita-surpassing-russia-and-china/>.  
<sup>49</sup> “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita Kazakhstan,” Statista, accessed December 23, 2025, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/436130/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-kazakhstan/?srsltid=AfmBOoqeRZdqvHKCSsx-IVm-jW6q1sT1uWqGeYJzKvtPZONtMtN1jeKW>.  
<sup>50</sup> “World Bank Open Data,” World Bank Open Data, accessed December 23, 2025, <https://data.worldbank.org>.

13.91x multiplier in just one generation. Over the same 30-year period, Mongolia has gone from \$652.67<sup>51</sup> to a projected \$7,010 this year,<sup>52</sup> ‘only’ a 10.7x increase.

This is something Mongolia can and should be proud of, but economic theory suggests that it should have seen higher growth than its neighbor to the east in percentage terms due to the “advantage of backwardness,” the idea that it is easier to grow economically by catching up from behind by going down the beaten path, than it is to sustain growth through innovation.<sup>53</sup> How did this happen? The reasons are complex. But one important reason is that, in the case of Kazakhstan, it has made a sustained, decades-long effort to raise its profile on the international stage.<sup>54</sup> Mongolia should copy this proven strategy to attract American investment and close the gap.

Second, the specific *kind* of investment matters greatly. Building refining and smelting capacity in Mongolia alongside mines would remove China’s current chokehold on the Mongolian copper supply chain. It could also potentially open up a cost-effective shipping corridor through the Russian port of Vladivostok (a detailed cost study would have to be conducted). A multi-modal commercial corridor for copper through Russia would give Mongolia greater strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China. This would make investing in Mongolia all the more attractive for the United States, especially if relations between Moscow and Washington normalize in the near future.

## Conclusion

The United States is searching for alternative sources of critical minerals to wean itself off China. One of those minerals, copper, will be of immense importance in the future economy. Mongolia has plentiful deposits with significantly lower extraction costs than those of Chile and Canada, the United States’ main sources of copper today. However, Mongolia’s tough neighborhood and complicated geopolitics present significant challenges. And yet these may be overcome through creative geostrategy.

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## Монгол Улсын зэсийн салбарт АНУ-ын хөрөнгө оруулалт хийх геоэдийн засгийн үндэслэл

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### Хураангуй

Хятад стратегийн чухал ашигт малтмалын дэлхийн нийлүүлэлтийн сүлжээнд ноёрхлоо тогтоосон нь Америкийн үндэсний аюулгүй байдалд заналхийлэл учруулж байна. Энэ нь давамгайлал бий болгох зорилготойгоор 1990-ээд оноос хэрэгжүүлж эхэлсэн стратегийн үр дүн юм. Японы жишгээр, Америк энэ салбарт стратегийн бие даасан байдлаа сэргээхийн тулд Монголын зэсийн салбарт хөрөнгө оруулах талаар нухацтай авч үзэх ёстой.

Орос, Хятадын дунд буфер байдлаар орших Монгол стратегийн тэнцвэрт байдлаа хадгалахын тулд олон тулгуурт гадаад бодлого явуулж ирсэн. Энэ хүрээнд Вашингтон чухал түншийн байр суурь эзэлдэг. Америкийн хувьд Хятад, Оросын нөлөөллийн огтлолцол болсон стратегийн энэ чухал бүс нутаг болох Азид худалдаа эдийн засгийн харилцааг хөгжүүлэх нь зүйтэй.

Монгол Улс дэлхийн хамгийн том зэсийн уурхайнуудын нэгийг эзэмшдэг. Харин АНУ боловсруулсан зэсийн цэвэр импортлогч. Хиймэл оюуны хувьсгал ирэх арван жилд зэсийн эрэлтийг эрс өсгөх тул эдийн засгийн ач холбогдол нь улам нэмэгдэх юм. Монголын зэс олборлолтын зардал бага, хүдрийн чанар Америкийн импортын гол эх үүсвэр болох Чили болон Канадынхаас өндөр байдал нь сонирхол татна. Монголд хөрөнгө оруулахад газарзүйн нөхцөлөөс шалтгаалан геополитикийн эрсдэл бий. Гэвч дотоодын боловсруулах хүчин чадал давхар анхаарснаар Монгол дахь зэсийн хөрөнгө оруулалтыг Хятадын нөлөөнөөс тусгаарлаж, Оросоор дамжих тээврийн маршрутыг нээх боломжтой.

**Түлхүүр үг:** Чухал ашигт малтмал, зэсийн олборлолт, нийлүүлэлтийн сүлжээний аюулгүй байдал, гуравдагч хөршийн бодлого

Received: November 16, 2025 | Accepted: December 25, 2025 | Published online: December 30, 2025



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