

North Korean Defector Dilemma: Mongolia's Idealism and Pragmatism

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Abstract

As a self-proclaimed “neutral bridge” between North and South Korea, Mongolia has long relied on its “Third Neighbor Policy” to maintain diplomatic autonomy amid the overlapping influence of China and Russia.

*However, three converging crises in 2024–2025—the collapse of the soft power narrative of the Mongolia-South Korea co-produced film *On the Way to the South*, the exposure of a South Korean Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC) spy scandal, and the diplomatic conflict triggered by a North Korean interpreter’s defection—have severely challenged this neutral identity. Based on geopolitical theory and economic dependence theory, this study adopts a case study method to analyze the contradictions between Mongolia’s humanitarian idealism and economic pragmatism. Findings indicate that Mongolia’s over-reliance on China and Russia for trade (over 80%) and the 2025 decline in exports to China (9.4%) have forced it to deepen economic ties with South Korea (bilateral trade volume reached \$550 million in Q1-Q3 2025), leading to diplomatic compromises that erode its neutral credibility. To break the dilemma, Mongolia should adopt “principled pragmatism”: consolidate diplomatic leverage through resource cooperation, restore trust with North Korea via low-sensitivity projects, and establish an institutionalized defector processing mechanism led by the UNHCR. This study enriches the research on small-state neutral diplomacy and provides insights for Northeast Asian stability.*

Keywords: Mongolia, neutral diplomacy, inter-Korean relations, defector dilemma, Third Neighbor Policy

Introduction

In the intricate geopolitical web of Northeast Asia, Mongolia has long clung to its identity as a “neutral bridge,” leveraging its “Third Neighbor Policy” to carve out autonomy amid the overlapping influence of China and Russia. What began in the 1990s as an expedient to reduce economic dependence on Beijing and Moscow has evolved into a values-based diplomatic stance, earning Ulaanbaatar credibility as a nonaligned mediator.

Yet between 2024 and 2025, three converging crises shattered this delicate balance: the collapse of the soft power narrative embodied by the Mongolia-South Korea co-produced film *On the Way to the South*, the exposure of a South Korean spy scandal, and a diplomatic crisis sparked by the defection of a North Korean interpreter. Together, these incidents laid

bare a sharp contradiction at the heart of Mongolia's neutrality: how to reconcile humanitarian idealism with economic pragmatism, and how to safeguard national sovereignty while appeasing both Seoul and Pyongyang. Coming in 2025 – the 35th anniversary of Mongolia-South Korea diplomatic ties – and on the heels of Ulaanbaatar's renewed engagement with Pyongyang in 2024, the crisis has become a defining test of Mongolia's diplomatic maturity.

This study adopts a case study method, focusing on the three 2024–2025 crises as core cases. Data sources include: (1) official documents (e.g., Mongolia's Third Neighbor Policy Implementation Report 2024, South Korean Special Prosecutor's Investigation Report); (2) international media reports (Kyodo News, Yonhap News, Montsame News etc); (3) economic statistics from Mongolia's National Statistical Office and South Korea's Korea National Statistical Office. By integrating qualitative analysis of event processes and quantitative verification of economic data, this study explores the causal mechanism between economic dependence and diplomatic compromise.

The Collapse of Soft Power Narrative: Film and Spy Scandal Soft Power Ambitions of On the Way to the South

Premiering in Ulaanbaatar in September 2024 and Seoul in April 2025, "On the Way to the South"¹ was intended to consolidate both countries' soft power. Co-directed by South Korea's Sangrae Kim and Mongolia's Battulga Suvid, the film eschewed political grandstanding for a human-centric narrative: a North Korean mother fleeing border patrols with her child, a Mongolian border guard torn between duty and compassion, and a defector grappling with separation trauma. Starring prominent Mongolian actors Sarantuya Sambuu, Erkhembayar Ganbold, Samdanpurev Oyunsambuu, and Zamilan Bold-Erdene alongside South Korean stars Park Kwang-hyun, Oh Su-jung, and Choi Jun-yong, the film deliberately framed Mongolia as a "moral mediator" – rejecting Seoul's hardline stance toward Pyongyang while disavowing North Korea's isolationist policies.

The film's release was meticulously timed to coincide with the 2025 bilateral anniversary, aiming to enhance Mongolia's voice in Korean Peninsula mediation while aligning with South Korea's "New Northern Policy"² which positions Mongolia as a Eurasian resource hub. Domestically, it stoked national pride in a small nation contributing to regional stability; internationally, it successfully rebranded the Third Neighbor Policy from a mere economic diversification strategy to a diplomatic framework rooted in humanitarian values.

The Spy Scandal and Sovereign Compromise

Yet this idealistic vision crumbled within months amid an espionage scandal. In late 2024, Mongolian authorities arrested two officers from South Korea's Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC) – a lieutenant colonel and a major – accusing them of recruiting Mon-

¹ Administrator. (2024). On the way to the south. Kortop Media. Available at: https://www.kortopmedia.co.kr/board/view?bd_id=wk01_en&wr_id=162 (Accessed: 25 June 2024).

² Yonhap News. (2021). (LEAD) S. Korea, Mongolia upgrade bilateral ties to 'strategic partnership'. Yonhap News Agency. Available at: <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210910001651315> (Accessed: 11 September 2021).

olian intermediaries to infiltrate North Korea's Embassy in Ulaanbaatar. The act violated the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, constituting a direct infringement of Mongolia's sovereignty.

Ulaanbaatar initially issued a stern condemnation, calling the incident a "serious breach of trust," but reversed course after KDIC Director Moon Sang-ho personally traveled to Ulaanbaatar^[3] to apologize. Mongolia dropped the charges and released the officers. This compromise stemmed from Mongolia's deep economic reliance on South Korea, yet it exposed diplomatic double standards: Ulaanbaatar was simultaneously deepening friendly engagement with Pyongyang, eroding its neutral image.

More alarmingly, an investigation by South Korean Special Prosecutor Cho Eun-seok revealed potential links between the spy operation⁴ in Mongolia and former President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law less than two weeks later. The probe found the KDIC's actions were a deliberate attempt to fabricate a security crisis over North Korean threats, providing a pretext for Yoon to suspend civil liberties and dissolve parliament in an authoritarian power grab. Notes from former KDIC Director Noh Sang-won – now on trial for treason – detailed plans to "launch provocative attacks along the Northern Limit Line (NLL)." Lee Seung-ho, the former operational chief of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the former defense minister had ordered drones to infiltrate North Korean territory. Internal KDIC memos also referenced using "abandoned balloons" equipped with propaganda or incendiary devices to provoke a North Korean response. Mongolia's territory had unwittingly become a stage for this political conspiracy, violating both its sovereign principles and cherished neutrality.

The Defector Crisis: Trust Rupture with North Korea

The Escalation of the Defector Incident

In August 2025, the defection of an interpreter during a high-level North Korean academic delegation's visit to Mongolia worsened the country's diplomatic predicament. Led by Tae Hyung-chul, president of the Academy of Social Sciences⁵, the delegation marked Pyongyang's first senior academic mission to Mongolia in seven years. Tae and his group were tasked with promoting the narrative that "Seoul has abandoned reunification." Chaos erupted during the visit, however, when an accompanying interpreter sought asylum at South Korea's embassy in Ulaanbaatar. According to Japan's Kyodo News^[6], Pyongyang responded with an unprecedented retaliation: recalling its ambassador to Mongolia – the first such move since 1999 – ending Oh Seung Ho⁷'s eight-year tenure.

³ Hwang, J.-y. (2025). Probe targets alleged link between Mongolia operation, martial law. Korea Herald. Available at: <https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10538131> (Accessed: 24 July 2025).

⁴ Kang, J.-g., Kwak, J.-s. & Shin, H.-c. (2025). Investigators see potential treason in alleged DIC plot to contact North Korea. Hankyoreh English Edition. Available at: https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1209337.html (Accessed: 23 July 2025).

⁵ Yu, E.-s. (2025). 북한 통역원, 몽골서 한국 대사관 통해 망명...지위 있는 인물 추정. Munhwa Ilbo Online. Available at: <https://www.mt.co.kr/society/2025/10/25/2025102513332549045> (Accessed: 26 October 2025).

⁶ Kyodo News. (2025). 【独自】北朝鮮通訳、モンゴルに亡命 代表団がウランバートル訪問時. Kyodo News. Available at: <https://www.47news.jp/13345157.html> (Accessed: 26 October 2025).

⁷ Office of the President of Mongolia. (2018). Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of DPRK presents cre-

The Warming and Rupture of Mongolia-North Korea Relations

This retaliation stood in stark contrast to the warming of Mongolia-North Korea relations in 2024. That year, Mongolia became the first country besides China and Russia to increase embassy staff in Pyongyang following the COVID-19 pandemic. In January, Mongolian Ambassador Luvsantseren Erdenedavaa presented his credentials to Choe Ryong Hae, chairman of the Presidium of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly⁸, with both sides commemorating the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties and the 35th anniversary of Kim Il Sung's visit to Mongolia.

In March 2024, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Park Myong Ho⁹ led a delegation to Mongolia – the first from Pyongyang's Foreign Ministry to Ulaanbaatar since the pandemic. These interactions reflected Pyongyang's recognition of Mongolia's decision to keep its embassy open¹⁰ during the pandemic and trust in its neutral stance. On July 31, 2025, Chairman of the State Great Khural Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve held another official meeting with Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Pak In Chol^[11], reaffirming commitments to long-term cooperation.

The interpreter's defection shattered this trust, with North Korea issuing a stern warning: it would not tolerate Mongolia becoming a "transit hub for defectors" or a "platform for South Korean conspiracies." Faced with the crisis, Mongolia adopted a "strategic silence," neither confirming nor denying the defection. Despite international accusations of "hypocrisy,"¹² the choice was a pragmatic one for a small nation: prioritizing avoidance of direct confrontation with Pyongyang¹³ and long-term regional stability over short-term moral grandstanding.

Economic Dependence: The Root of Diplomatic Compromise

Mongolia's Economic Vulnerability

Mongolia's series of compromises in 2024-2025 stemmed from severe economic vulnerability. Over 80 percent of its trade relies on China and Russia, making its economic

dentals. Office of the President of Mongolia. Available at: <https://president.mn/en/2018/01/08/ambassador-extraordinary-and-plenipotentiary-of-dprk-presents-credentials/> (Accessed: 9 January 2018).

⁸ Ooluun, B. (2024). Mongolian Ambassador to DPRK Presents His Credentials. MONTSAME. Available at: <https://motsame.mn/en/read/336605> (Accessed: 1 February 2024).

⁹ Sumiya Chuluunbaatar. (2024). Why did North Korea's deputy foreign minister visit Ulaanbaatar? The Diplomat. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/why-did-north-koreas-deputy-foreign-minister-visit-ulaanbaatar/> (Accessed: 1 April 2024).

¹⁰ Sumiya Chuluunbaatar. (2023). Will North Korea's foreign minister visit Mongolia this year? The Diplomat. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/will-north-koreas-foreign-minister-visit-mongolia-this-year/> (Accessed: 1 June 2023).

¹¹ State Great Hural of Mongolia. (2025). Chairman of the State Great Hural of Mongolia, Mr. Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve, met with Mr. Pak In Chol, President of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly. State Great Hural of Mongolia. Available at: <https://www.parliament.mn/en/nn/75515/> (Accessed: 2 August 2025).

¹² Karube, T. (2024). Ex-Mongolia president says employing North Koreans would spur engagement. Kyodo News. Available at: <https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/49057> (Accessed: 26 July 2024).

¹³ Miyamoto, S. (2024). Friendship between North Korea and Mongolia: Friendly relations between neighbors of different regimes. ROLES Review, Vol.5. Available at: https://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/uploads/body_pdf/file/26/5Satoru_MIYAMOTO.pdf (Accessed: 29 November 2025).

lifeline vulnerable to fluctuations in their economies and policy shifts. The Third Neighbor Policy is essentially a survival strategy to mitigate this risk. By 2025, South Korea had emerged as the policy's core pillar: Seoul's semiconductor and electric vehicle industries create a strong demand for Mongolia's silver, molybdenum, coal, copper, and rare earths (critical minerals)¹⁴, forging a deeply complementary economic bond built on earlier energy and infrastructure cooperation.

Economic data from 2025 underscored the urgency of this dependence. Amid a slowdown in China's economy, Mongolia's exports to China fell by 9.4 percent in the first three quarters, with coal revenues plummeting by 41 percent¹⁵. While South Korea sought to fill the resulting gap, the actual data indicates that the outcome was less favorable for Mongolia: according to South Korean statistics¹⁶, bilateral trade volume exceeded US\$550 million in the first three quarters of 2025. Notably, although total trade volume rose by 19 percent, this growth was driven by a 21.2 percent increase in South Korea's exports to Mongolia, whereas South Korea's imports from Mongolia declined by 16.3 percent (see Table 1).

Table 1. Mongolia-South Korea Bilateral Trade Data (Q1-Q3 2025)

Indicator	Value/Growth Rate	Core Composition
Bilateral Trade Volume	\$550 million	+19% Year-on-Year
South Korea's Exports to Mongolia	—	Automobiles, electronics, machinery
South Korea's Imports from Mongolia	—	Coal (-41%), copper, rare earths

High-Level Diplomacy and Interest Binding

Seoul pledged to establish a “Mongolia-South Korea Rare Earth Cooperation Center” in November 2025¹⁷ to promote joint exploration and smart mining. The ongoing negotiation of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)¹⁸ promises not only immediate economic relief but also critical technology for Mongolia's sustainable development¹⁹. This eco-

¹⁴ Akhmetzianova, A. (2025). Mongolia agrees to stronger bilateral cooperation in rare metals. Korea.net. Available at: <https://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Business/view?articleId=267959> (Accessed: 14 March 2025).

¹⁵ Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Mongolia. (2025). 2025年1—9月蒙古对华货物出口额同比下降9.4%。Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. Available at: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwjjg/scdy/yz/art/2025/art_c370ff9c20b04fb480e3a7244c83a382.html (Accessed: 11 October 2025).

¹⁶ Korea Customs Service. (2025). 관세청 수출입무역통계. Korea Customs Service Trade Statistics Portal. Available at: <https://tradedata.go.kr/cts/index.do> (Accessed: 29 November 2025).

¹⁷ Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), Republic of Korea. (2025). Korea and Mongolia bolster full life cycle cooperation for rare metals. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) Republic of Korea. Available at: <https://english.motie.go.kr/eng/article/EATCLdfa319ada/2236/view> (Accessed: 13 March 2025).

¹⁸ Unknown author. (2024). 한-몽골 경제동반자협정(EPA) 제4차 공식협상 개최. Korea Free Trade Agreement Commission. Available at: https://www.fta.go.kr/webmodule/common/download1.jsp?boardid=64&tablename=fta_new_board01&seqno=144935&fileseq=5410 (Accessed: 29 November 2025).

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. (2024). 제8차 한-몽골 공동위원회 개최. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4076/view.do?seq=371088 (Accessed: 13 November 2024).

nomic allure has gradually translated into significant South Korean diplomatic influence.

In April 2025, even as South Korea descended into domestic turmoil – with former President Yoon facing impeachment over his 2024 emergency decree – National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-sik led a delegation to Mongolia²⁰. His framing of Mongolia as a “core partner for regional stability” implied a quid pro quo: economic support contingent on Ulaanbaatar aligning with Seoul on the Korean Peninsula. On July 30, 2025, Chairman Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve held an official meeting with Woo Won-sik²¹, putting forward three core demands: resolving obstacles in the construction of central heating plants in 10 Mongolian provinces funded by South Korean concessional loans; facilitating mutual people-to-people exchanges; addressing the issue of Mongolian citizens being repatriated at South Korean borders.

In response, Woo pledged to promptly resume the heating plant project and explore measures to facilitate travel (e.g., electronic visas). Following South Korea’s June presidential election, new President Lee Jae-myung²² tightened this linkage further, proposing “accelerating EPA negotiations” and “promoting visa-free entry for Mongolian citizens” (one of Ulaanbaatar’s key demands, given that approximately 50,000 Mongolians work or study in South Korea, half of them illegally) in exchange for Mongolia’s support on the Korean Peninsula²³.

Path Forward: Toward Principled Pragmatism

Consolidating Diplomatic Leverage Through Economic Cooperation

Mongolia must convert its resource advantages into substantive diplomatic leverage. In EPA negotiations²⁴, it should clarify two non-negotiable core demands: first, that South Korea sign a binding agreement prohibiting all intelligence activities on Mongolian territory, repairing the trust deficit caused by the KDIC spy scandal; second, that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) take the lead in a defector processing mechanism, balancing humanitarian principles with sovereign security.

Economically, Mongolia needs to move beyond the low-value-added “raw material exporter” model, promoting value-added cooperation in rare earth processing and smart

²⁰ Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Mongolia. (2025). 대한민국 국회의장 몽골 공식 방문(2025.4.26.~4.30.). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. Available at: https://overseas.mofa.go.kr/mn-ko/brd/m_375/view.do?seq=1346956 (Accessed: 3 May 2025).

²¹ State Great Hural of Mongolia. (2025). Chairman D. Amarbayasgalan: We request that the issue of Mongolian citizens being turned back at the South Korean border be resolved. State Great Hural of Mongolia. Available at: <https://www.parliament.mn/en/nm/75498/> (Accessed: 28 November 2025).

²² Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President of the Republic of Korea). (2025). 이재명 대통령, 후렐수흐 몽골 대통령과 첫 통화 관련 강유정 대변인 서면 브리핑. Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President of the Republic of Korea). Available at: <https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/briefing/Tnge2MtF> (Accessed: 5 September 2025).

²³ Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea. (2025). [보도자료] 김민석 국무총리, 몽골 수석부총리 겸 경제개발부 장관 접견 (Press Release). Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea. Available at: <https://www.opm.go.kr/opm/news/press-release.do?mode=view&articleNo=159790> (Accessed: 24 September 2025).

²⁴ Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), Republic of Korea. (2024). Korea and Mongolia enter 4th negotiating round for bilateral EPA. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), Republic of Korea. Available at: <https://english.motie.go.kr/eng/article/EATCLdfa319ada/2139/view> (Accessed: 27 November 2024).

manufacturing to nurture domestic industries. Reducing dependence on a single market and resource exports will reshape Mongolia from a resource supplier to an industrial partner – aligning with Seoul’s supply chain security interests²⁵ while granting Ulaanbaatar economic initiative.

Restoring Trust with North Korea

Restoring trust with Pyongyang requires a shift from reactive to proactive diplomacy. First, Ulaanbaatar should use backchannel communications to address the interpreter defection candidly, reaffirming the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs” and clarifying that Mongolia will not become a tool to confront North Korea^[26]. Second, it should restart low-sensitivity cooperation projects – cultural exchanges, agricultural aid, and public health collaboration – avoiding contentious Korean Peninsula issues and repairing official trust through people-to-people interactions. Third, it should revive the “Ulaanbaatar Regional Forum on Denuclearization and Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula,²⁷” positioning it as a nonconfrontational technical dialogue platform (focused on issues such as family reunions) to reactivate inter-Korean communication channels.

Establishing an Institutionalized Defector Mechanism

The fundamental solution to the defector dilemma lies in establishing an institutionalized response mechanism. Supported by the UNHCR, this framework should include three core elements: clear asylum application criteria, strict confidential processing procedures, and third-country resettlement options. Such a system would safeguard the humanitarian rights of vulnerable groups while preventing individual incidents from escalating into diplomatic crises, translating the “humanitarian intermediary” vision of “On the Way to the South” into actionable policy.

Conclusion

Both North and South Korea have not explicitly designated Mongolia as a “neutral bridge” between them, but we ourselves have proclaimed and pursued this role.

North Korea views Mongolia’s self-proclamation as a “neutral bridge” with cautious approval, valuing it for maintaining stable diplomatic ties and potential mediation in regional issues, though it warns against actions that could support defectors or tilt toward South Korean influence.

²⁵ U.S. Department of State. (2023). The Launch of the United States–Mongolia–Republic of Korea Trilateral Meeting. U.S. Department of State. Available at: <https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-launch-of-the-united-states-mongolia-republic-of-korea-trilateral-meeting/> (Accessed: 3 June 2023).

²⁶ Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). (2025). ‘Flower Basket to C.C., WPK from C.C., Mongolian People’s Party’. Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Available at: <http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/64e900f5bd0353837ca02d7babcce3ad-fbd61d3ebe6c0aa127fd5c247e4c6bb086e3f678356c6bea6037dffb29b9da0c.kcmsf> (Accessed: 9 October 2025).

²⁷ Ulaanbaatar Dialogue. (2018). ULAANBAATAR DIALOGUE ON NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY. Institute for Strategic Studies, Mongolia (ISS). Available at: <https://iss.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/UBD-2018-Publication.pdf> (Accessed: 29 November 2025).

South Korea regards Mongolia's self-proclaimed neutral role positively, integrating it into policies like the New Northern Policy to enhance economic cooperation and leverage Mongolia as a partner in promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Limitations & Future Research: This study focuses on Mongolia's inter-Korean diplomacy; future research could explore the impact of Sino-Russian-US competition on Mongolia's neutrality, or conduct comparative studies with other neutral small states (e.g., Switzerland, Finland).

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Монголоор дамжих Умард Солонгосын дүрвэгсдийн хямрал: Идеализм ба pragmatism

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Хураангуй

Монгол Улс нь Умард болон Өмнөд Солонгосын хооронд өөрийгөө “төвийг сахисан гүүр” хэмээн тодорхойлж, Хятад, Оросын давхातсан нөлөөллийн дунд дипломат бие даасан байдлаа хадгалахын тулд “Гуравдагч хөршийн бодлого”-доо тулгуурласаар ирсэн. Гэвч 2024-2025 онд Монгол-Солонгосын хамтарсан “Өмнөдийг зорих замд” киноны зөвлөн хүчний бодлогын бүтэлгүйтэл, Өмнөд Солонгосын Батлан хамгаалахын тагнуулын командал (KDIC)-тай холбоотой тагнуулын дуулиан ил болсон явдал, мөн Умард Солонгосын орчуулагчийн дүрвэлтээс үүдэлтэй дипломат зөрчил зэрэг гурван хямрал зэрэгцэн тохиосон нь энэхүү төвийг сахисан байр сууринд ноцтой сорилт учруулав.

Геополитикийн онол болон эдийн засгийн хараат байдлын онолд тулгуурлан энэхүү судалгаа нь кэйс судалгааны аргыг ашиглан Монголын хүмүүнлэгийн идеализм болон эдийн засгийн pragmatism хоорондын зөрчлийг шинжилсэн болно. Судалгааны үр дүнгээс хараад Монгол худалдааны хувьд Хятад, Оросоос хэт хамааралтай (80 гаруй хувь) байгаа болон 2025 онд Хятад руу хийх экспорт буурсан (9.4 хувь) нь тус улсыг Өмнөд Солонгостой эдийн засгийн харилцаагаа гүнзгийрүүлэхэд (2025 оны эхний гурван улиралд хоёр талын худалдааны эргэлт 550 сая ам.долларт хүрсэн) хүргэж, улмаар төвийг сахисан итгэлцлийг сургуулах дипломат буулт хийхэд хүргэж байна.

Энэхүү мухардлаас гарахын тулд Монгол Улс “зарчимч pragmatism”-ыг баримталж, баялагийн хамтын ажиллагаагаар дамжуулан дипломат хөшүүрээ бэхжүүлэх, улс төрийн эмзэг бус төслүүдээр дамжуулан БНАСАУ-тай итгэлцлээ сэргээх, НҮБ-ын Дүрвэгсдийн

асуудал эрхэлсэн дээд комиссарын газрын удирдлагаа дор дүрвэгсдийн асуудлыг шийдвэрлэх институцилсэн механизмыг бий болгох шаардлагатай. Энэхүү судалгаа нь жиижиг улсын төвийг сахисан дипломат ажиллагааны талаарх судалгааг баяжуулж, Зүүн хойд Азийн тогтвортой байдлыг хангах талаарх ойлголтыг өгч байна.

Түлхүүр үз: Монгол Улс, төвийг сахисан дипломат ажиллагаа, Солонгос хоорондын харилцаа, дүрвэгсдийн хямрал, гуравдагч хөрийн бодлого

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