US - JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE ADrift?

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How stable is the US-Japan security alliance in the post-Cold War era? Have the “end of history”, the “end of the Cold War”, the end of a “hegemonic world”, and the “end of geography” (or the beginning of a borderless world economy) so altered the national security needs and priorities of the United States and Japan that they no longer need or desire the security alliance they have maintained since 1952? Will the alliance remain the anchor of Japanese and US policies in the Asia-Pacific region? In the age of multilateralism, will the two countries seek multilateral alternatives that will replace the bilateral alliance? In this brief analysis, I will review the ongoing debate in Japan and in the United States concerning the future of the US-Japan security alliance in the post-Cold War era.

Debate in Japan

In Japan, there is general consensus that the era of hegemony, or Ax Americana, is over and that global peace and stability requires support and cooperation of the United States, Japan, and Europe. This view was strengthened by the Persian Gulf War Japan’s commitment of $13 billion to the US-led alliance against Saddam Hussein marked a major departure from its previous policy of staying out of international conflicts altogether. Although the international community was highly critical of the slow decision making in Tokyo and its exclusively monetary role during the Gulf War, Japan was able to share a substantial portion of the burden of fighting the first major regional conflict after the end of the Cold War. This experience paved the for Japan’s subsequent participation in UN peacekeeping activities in Kampuchea, Mozambique, Rwanda, and the Golan Heights.

Most Japanese supporters of the US-Japan security treaty believe that the bilateral alliance is in the national interest of both countries. They maintain that the US-Japan security arrangement allows Japan to continue to limit its defense capabilities to those required for strictly defensive purposes and to maintain its nonmilitary policy in the region. They also recognize that the United States needs to maintain its bases in Japan not only to deter aggression against Japan but also to project US military power throughout the Asia-Pacific region where its trade and economic interests are growing. Another reason why they support the bilateral security treaty is that in their view, the pact helps, both symbolically and substantively, to contain the potentially destabilizing effects of trade and
economic friction between the two countries. To them, the treaty is the symbol of a mutually beneficial political relationship. They also appreciate the fact that the security treaty allows Washington and Tokyo to maintain a mutually acceptable burden-sharing arrangement. The most passive reason for their support of the US-Japan security alliance is that there is no alternative policy that side can develop to meet its post-Cold War security requirements. Tokyo continues to rely on Washington’s security commitment as one of the two pillars of Japanese defense policy as long as the other pillar, the build up of, its self-defense capabilities, remains constrained by political and financial considerations, as well as by international public opinion. Washington finds no ally as reliable and willing as Tokyo in maintaining post-Cold War security presence in the Asia-Pacific.

On the other hand, criticisms against the US-Japan security alliance are growing in Japan. Some analysts accurately point out that US policy in Asia-Pacific, as elsewhere in the world, is increasingly self-centered and driven by economic nationalism. They believe Washington wants to use its US security commitments in the region and region’s growing reliance on the US military presence in the post-Cold War Asia Pacific to US economic advantage, for example by linking US security protection to trade concessions from its allies and stepped burden-sharing. The increasing host-nation support that Tokyo provides for US troops on Japan is coming under growing criticism by Japanese nationalists. Even supporters of the bilateral alliance fear that the US-Japan security treaty would lose its credibility in Japan if Washington should press Tokyo to support, let alone participate in US military action that went beyond the protection of Japan. Not only would such demand be totally opposed by the pacifist Japanese public, the observers suggest; it would be rejected by the Japanese government which has disavowed collective self-defense i.e.; participation in joint military action with the United States or with any other country beyond the limits of Japan’s own defense. They prefer the current bilateral security arrangement which anticipates no such action. Nevertheless, they are cognizant of the growing criticism in the United States that Americans are turning into Japan’s hired soldiers (vole).

These concerns have led some Japanese to advocate reduced Japanese reliance on the bilateral alliance and development of other components to their national security policy to supplement, not replace the US-Japan alliance. They envision a collective security system in Asia in which the US-Japan alliance would be one part, albeit still the most important part. Others see greater oppor-
tunities in Japan’s avowedly more strategic use of economic assistance to developing countries, including China. Some see an additional avenue for Japanese security policy in a more active participation in UN peacekeeping activities. Still others advocate Japan’s arms control initiatives in both nuclear and the conventional field.

There are others who boldly assert that the US-Japan security treaty has outlived its strategic value for Japan and that Tokyo should seriously consider discontinuing the treaty, although this view remains a minority view, the idea that the US-Japan alliance needs to be supplemented by additional institutions of national and regional security is gaining support among security analysts in Japan. Some argue that multilateralization of US-Japan cooperation should be helpful in reducing the military aspects of the bilateral relations but expanding bilateral cooperation in the political, diplomatic, and economic fields. Support for multilateralism found its way into the report on Japan’s post-Cold War security policy submitted to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August 1994 by an advisory committee appointed by his predecessor Morihiro Hosokawa in February 1994. The so-called “Higuchi Report” appeared to place equal, if not greater importance on developing a multilateral security framework in the Asia-Pacific and on maintaining the US-Japan bilateral alliance.

Amidst the increasingly animated national security debate in Japan, the Japanese government adopted in November 1995 a new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO); to replace its predecessor of 1976. The new NDPO reaffirmed the centrality of the Japan-US security treaty to the nation’s security policy. As the rationale for adopting the new defense outline, the Japanese government pointed to the end of the global Cold War and growing expectations regarding Japanese defense forces’ roles beyond the traditionally conceived national defense, to include effective response to major natural disasters and acts of terrorism and contribution to the building of a more stable security environment through international peacekeeping activities and the promotion of international cooperation through international emergency relief activities. The document calls for the enhancement of the credibility of the Japan-US security cooperation and the building of more rationalized, efficient, compact, and flexible defense capabilities to respond to Japan’s own defense needs and to contribute to the building of a more stable international environment. The new NDPO envisages a reconfigured and smaller Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the total number of personnel to be reduced from the present 180,000 to 160,000 including a newly established 15,000 rapidly deployable reservists. Major changes planned for the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) include reorgani-
zation of escort flotillas from present ten regional/district units totaling 30 ships to seven units of 21 ships altogether, increase in the number of minesweeping units from one to two, reconfiguration of ground patrol units from the current sixteen units thirteen units, and reduction tactical of aircraft from about 220 now to about 170. The 1995 document also envisions a restructured Air Self-Defense Force, with the fleet of tactical aircraft to be reduced from the present number of about 430 to about 400 including about 300 fighter aircraft.

The new NDPO presents no new strategic thinking. Although it peripherally opens up possible areas of Japanese contribution to regional security, it falls far short of calling for expanding Japanese defense capabilities to respond to possible regional contingencies or redefining the US-Japan security alliance in the new strategic environment now emerging in the Asia-Pacific. Its single most important function was to reaffirm the Japanese government’s commitment to the maintenance of defense capabilities and the US-Japan security cooperation. The new document does acknowledge “quantitative arms reductions and restructuring of defense forces in Russia” but warns about “diversified security concerns,” including regional conflicts and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 1995 document refers to “unclear and uncertain elements” in the international situation generally and stresses the presence in Japan’s immediate region of nuclear forces and other large-scale military capabilities, the expansion and modernization of military capabilities, and continuing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

**Debate in the United States**

Views among US analysts are quite mixed. Some critics of Japan’s economics-first policy urge Japan on to become a “normal state” by making greater military contributions to international peace and security.” However, there are analysts who caution against encouraging Japanese defense build up for fear that the economic superpower may also want to become a military power. Henry Kissinger, for example, has warned that Japan might not be content with its stages as an economic giant and a military dwarf.¹²

The changed balance of US-Japan economic power is clearly a major factor affecting US views of the strategic environment in general and the relationship with Japan in particular. Some analysts expect a multiplier balance-of-power to emerge in the Asia-Pacific. Others say neither a bipolar nor a multiplier system is in sight, predicting a prolonged period of uncertainty and potential instability.

There is a growing populist view in the United States that Japan, with its mercantilist policy, is a threat to the US national security. Some analysts predict
that Japan’s GNP will surpass that of the United States early in the next decade and that such a change will have “enormous geopolitical significance.” 13 Others discount such warnings and assert that the physical and geostrategic constraints of Japan will always limit the nation’s ability to project power and structure international relations. 14 Richard Betts has declared, for example, “The notion that it would be better for Japan to be a regular military power is strategic. Old Thinking, the echo of concerns about burden-sharing in the global conflict with communism.” 15 Some observers maintain that the US-Japan security alliance provides the United States with access to the fast advancing Japanese defense and civilian technology with military applications through two-way technology transfer. They correctly note that US interest in Japanese defense technology was motivated by both the fear of a potential competitor in future weapons development and potential cost savings through cooperation in weapons research and development. 16 Some analysts in the United States warn that the long-term implications of Japan’s high-technology defense research and development for the defense policies of its Asian neighbors. 17 Others advocate a more aggressive, economics-driven security relations with Japan as part of a more comprehensive national strategy. 18 Still others see the continuing lack of two-way technology transfer as potentially detrimental to the increasingly nationalistic US defense technology policy.19

Behind the conflicting US views of Japan’s role in the post-Cold Asia-Pacific is difficulty of assessing the complex structure of the post-Cold War global and regional strategic environment and its implications for US strategic policy in the region. One observer points out; “Global unpopularity now coincides with regional multiplicity... Although the United States is in a military class by itself, it cannot act independently in many cases but needs the cooperation of allies to provide bases.” 20 Another analyst posits that at the global strategic level, “bipolarity is giving way, not to unpopularity (with the United States bestriding the world like a colossus) nor yet to simple multiplicity (with a group of roughly equal, globally engaged “great powers”), but to a set of regional subsystems in which clusters of Contiguous states interact mainly with one another. 21 the strategic environment of Asia-Pacific today is neither bipolar nor multiplier and is affected less by the global strategic balance than by the relations among the region is major powers. Indeed, “The change from worldwide bipolarity to unipolarity makes the global dimension of strategic competition irrelevant” at the regional strategic level.22 These observations clearly point to Japan’s increasing importance as a global economic power and regional political
power and to the United States’ and others’ need to reassess their relations with Japan in the new strategic context.

Official US policy has called for continued forward deployment of US forces in the Asia-Pacific. Washington views the US military presence in the region as essential to regional stability, in discouraging the emergence of a regional hegemony, and in enhancing Washington’s ability to influence a wide spectrum of important political and economic issues in the region. However, Washington is increasingly unable to bear the cost of its military presence in the region and therefore appreciates Japan’s increasing burden-sharing.

Some US analysts have complained that Washington has no coherent strategy and is poorly organized for dealing with Japan. The Aspen Institute’s Strategic Group proposed in 1993 that the United States encourage Japan to play a larger role in international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the IMF, and G-7. The group also called for the establishment of a multilateral security organization in Asia, similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). On bilateral economic issues, the group called on Japan to cooperate on macroeconomic and exchange rate policies that would stimulate domestic demand in Japan and also called on the United States to reduce its budget deficit and improve product competitiveness. The group was chaired by Joseph Nye, Jr., who subsequently served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense and led the so-called “Nye Initiative”.

The Nye Initiative’s centerpiece was United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Region issued in February 1995. The so-called Nye Report made it clear that Washington had no intention of disengaging from region either politically or in security terms or reducing its security cooperation with Tokyo. The document emphasized the importance of the US presence for the stability of
the region and for US national interests, including national security, commercial access, navigational freedom, and the prevention of the emergence of a regional hegemonic power. According to the report, the US-Japan security alliance was the linchpin of US security policy in the Asia-Pacific. The report also alliances in the region with balance-of-power politics, (3) creation of loose regional institutions to replace US-centered alliances, (4) creation of a NATO-like regional alliance, and (5) maintaining US leadership. The last of these is the strategy of his choice and the strategy the Clinton administration has adopted. According to Nye, this strategy should involve reinforcement of US alliances on the basis of a new strategic rationale that replaces the now defunct Cold War rationale, maintenance of forward-based troop presence for deterrence purposes, and development of APEC, ARF, and other regional institutions for confidence-building measures that will complement (not replace) US alliance leadership.

These assessments and priorities were incorporated into President Clinton’s February 1996 report to Congress on US national security strategy. The report’s section on East Asia and the Pacific mentions that the President’s strategy to develop a “New Pacific Community” requires the linking of security requirements with economic realities and concern for democracy and human rights. Defining the United States as a “Pacific nation”, the US strategy calls for maintaining an active presence and leadership in the region and refers specifically to the 100,000 strong troop presence as contributing to regional stability.

These developments notwithstanding, criticism in the United States against a continued alliance with Japan is not likely to disappear anytime soon. On the contrary criticism may likely grow. Nye has identified five major objections to the Clinton administration’s policy in East Asia: (1) Japan may decide to end its reliance on the alliance with the United States, (2) the United States can no longer financially maintain the level of troop presence required for the strategy of US leadership in the region, (3) the United States should use its security leverage to cure its economic woes, including a threatened withdrawal of US security commitment, (4) East Asia will simply use the United States and later exclude it from future political-security arrangements in the region, and (5) the Clinton administration has no China strategy. On the sustainability of the US-Japan security alliance, Nye correctly notes that Tokyo has reaffirmed the option of maintaining the US alliance and points to the Higuchi Report noted above as evidence.

Chalmers Johnson has offered the most articulate, if not necessarily the most credible criticism against the Clinton administration’s policy toward Japan. Johnson and E.B.Keehn of Cambridge University declare that the end of the
Cold war and the altered balance of power—in favor of Japan—have eliminated the only meaningful strategic rationale for the US-Japan alliance. They assert that the mutually of strategic interests between the United States and Japan is no longer assured. The authors maintain that the continued US-Japan security alliance delays Japan’s coming to terms with the problems of Article Nine of the Japanese constitution, that the “outdated security policy” of the United States short-circuits the nascent security debate in Japan in which they note a call for Japan to become an “ordinary country”. They write: “If Japan is truly to remain the linchpin of US strategy in Asia, any serious rethinking of US security policy must center on rewriting or peacefully (dismantling) the Japan-US Security Treaty”. To them, “a United States that continues to distrust Japan’s ability to act as a true ally” is a more serious threat to a peaceful Asia-Pacific region, rather than China’s continued expansion.

The Johnson-Keen critique underestimates the importance of firm US security guarantees for preventing Japanese remilitarization in the region of continuing uncertainty. Northeast Asia remains a potentially dangerous region. The United States, Japan, and other East Asian countries share security concern regarding the political uncertainty in nuclear China and nuclear Russia and the tension on the divided Korean Peninsula. Beijing’s saber rattling against Taiwan during the latter’s presidential election in 1995 was quite disturbing to Japan as regards the security of sea lines of communication (Slices). Beijing’s unsettled territorial disputes with its neighbors in the South China Sea are an additional concern to Tokyo which has its own territorial dispute with Beijing over the Sneak (Tiaoyutai) Island in the East China Sea. The Johnson-Keehn argument also fails to see that the US-Japan alliance and development of multi-lateral security institutions in the Asia-Pacific are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, the current US policy assumes that simultaneous pursuit of the two options is not only possible but desirable. Moreover, the Johnson-Keehn argument ignores the growing acceptance among Southeast Asian leaders of the need to maintain the US-Japan security alliance for regional stability.

Supporters of the US-Japan security alliance believe that the alliance needs to be strengthened or redefined to respond to the changed strategic environment. They see the strategic value of the US-Japan security alliance increasingly in a regional context, as an instrument of stability for the Asia-Pacific region, to manage the growing Chinese economic-military power, to contain a possible military contingency on the volatile Korean Peninsula, and to build a new balance-of-power system in the region. They are fearful that should
Korea attack South Korea, even out of desperation, and Japan stood by while the United States came to the aid of South Korea as required by their defense pact, the US-Japan alliance would be doomed to end. Supporters of the US-Japan alliance also acknowledge that many Asians fear Japan’s strategic “breakout” and value the bilateral alliance as means of preventing it.

Many supporters of the US-Japan security alliance call for a thorough review of all the basic assumptions underlying the existing bilateral alliance, with respect to common threats, common interests, the bilateral balance of burdens, and the possibilities of collective security or cooperative security as a substitute to the bilateral arrangement.40 One US analyst argues that there is a strong case for building a global partnership in a redefined, mature, and more equal US-Japan relationship but that the survival of a US-Japan alliance after the Cold War requires a new strategic rationale, demonstrable benefits to both the United States and Japanese publics, and a more equal overall relationship between the two countries. The US analyst laments that Japanese political system is in a “dysfunctional state of flux” and incapable of making the political decisions necessary to update the alliance without great difficulty. Manning welcomes the Prime Minister’s Advisory Commission’s report of August 199441 as “breaking the taboos” and expanding the boundaries of Japan’s defense role. He notes the report calls for broadening cooperation in several key areas.42

These analysts would support most of the recommendations contained in Japan’s new National Defense Program Outline introduced earlier but urge the Japanese to conduct a more rigorous debate on them.

“Okinawa” and Beyond

Discussion of national security issues in democracies should always involve wide public participation. Unfortunately, however, the views outlined above have been tossed about among small circles of security analysts and policymakers in the United States and Japan. With the United States totally absorbed in the Presidential election and Japan preoccupied with domestic financial problems against the backdrop of unruly coalition politics, neither Washington nor Tokyo has been able to articulate a compelling post-Cold War strategic vision to inform public debate on the bilateral security relations.43 Worse still, communication between the United States and Japan has been strained by thorny trade issues, threatening to cloud national security calculations vis-a-vis each other. It was by accident, therefore, that Washington and Tokyo were forced to come up with a firm justification for the bilateral security alliance in the post-Cold War world.
The most serious challenge to the US-Japan security treaty since the end of the Cold War came not from any strategic debate in either country but from an incident in Okinawa in 1995 involving the rape three US servicemen of a young Japanese girl. When the US military refused to surrender the suspects to local authorities during investigative phases of the case, the fear quickly spread throughout Okinawa that even through the incident took place off the US base, the soldiers would be tried under US jurisdiction. Against the background of heightened emotions among the Okinawa people over the case, the US government agreed to turn the suspects over to Japanese authorities. The issue soon became linked to the broader issue of US bases in Japan when Governor of Okinawa Masahide Ota defied the Japanese government’s demand that he sign an administrative order forcing land owners to release their real estate for continued use by the US military. The governor argued that if Tokyo believed the Japan-US security treaty so essential to the nation’s security, then the whole nation should share the cost of the US presence by moving some of the bases in his prefecture to other parts of the country. The governor’s argument was supported by a large segment of the people of Okinawa in whose islands a disproportionate share of the US military bases are located. Eventually, the three US servicemen were tried by the Naha District Court, and on March 7, 1996 found guilty and sentenced to between six years and six months and seven years in prison. As soon as the judgement was rendered, the US Department of Defense issued a statement that the US government respected the verdict and hoped that the two countries could begin to heal the wound.

The governor’s defiance against Tokyo was directed more immediately at Tokyo’s inability to equalize the burden of the treaty in terms of base siting than at the bilateral security treaty as such. It also reflected the sense of frustration that many Okinawa people felt over the absence of any visible “peace dividends” in the supposedly more peaceful world. If mishandled by either Tokyo or Washington, the incident could potentially erode the public support for the Japan-US security treaty in the post-Cold War era. While emotions ran high in Okinawa, the base issue and the future of the bilateral security treaty were linked in many people’s minds. It was urgent under these circumstances that Tokyo and Washington sharpen their rationale for the bilateral security alliance in the absence of a clear and present military threat in the post-Cold War era.

President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto met in Santa Monica, California in February 1996 and assured each other that the US-Japan relationship was the most important bilateral relationship in the world. The two leaders
met again in Tokyo in April and issued a joint declaration reaffirming the essential importance of the US-Japan security treaty to the two countries and to the region.

“Japan-US Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century” amounted to a bilateral endorsement of the Nye Initiative and the NDPO described earlier. Its essential points were:

1. The US-Japan alliance continues to underline the dynamic economic growth in the Asia-Pacific.
2. The two countries’ national policies are guided by the shared values of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights.
3. Although the region is the most dynamic area of the globe, there is instability and uncertainty.
4. The US-Japan security relationship, based on the bilateral security treaty, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment in the region; the most effective framework for Japan’s defense is close defense cooperation between the two countered and US deterrence under the bilateral security treaty remains the guarantee for Japan’s security; and the continued US military presence in the Asia-Pacific is essential for the region’s peace and stability.47
5. To enhance the credibility of the bilateral security relationship, the two countries will cooperate in bilateral security consultation, a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in regional contingencies, implementation of the April 1996 agreement on reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and services between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the US armed forces, enhancement of interoperability between the JSDF and the US forces, and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
6. In light of the Okinawa situation, the two leaders also expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion by November 1996 of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) process to consolidate, realign, and reduce US facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the bilateral security treaty.
7. Regarding regional cooperation, the two leaders agreed to further cooperate with China to ensure its positive and constructive role in the region provide encouragement and cooperation for Russia’s reforms (nothing the importance of full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo
Declaration), cooperate with South Korea to stabilize the situation on the Ko-
rean Peninsula, and work together to further develop multilateral regional secu-
rity dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Fo-
rum and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

(7) Globally, the two leaders agreed to cooperate in support of the United
Nations and other international organizations in the areas of peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief operations, arms control and disarmament, APEC, the North
Korean nuclear problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace imple-
mentation process in the former Yugoslavia.

The single most important message of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit in
Tokyo was that the United States and Japan remained committed to their bilat-
eral security treaty as the linchpin of their regional and global policies in the 21st
century. The single most critical question that has emerged from the summit is
how the bilateral security alliance will be developed in a broader regional context
and whether the review of the 1978 Guidelines mentioned above will envision
the broadening of the geographical limits of Japanese-US defense cooperation,
including in regional contingencies. More specifically, the joint declaration makes
no mention of the “Far East”, a term that the existing security treaty uses in
reference to the geographical limits of the treaty’s application but instead refers
repeatedly to the “Asia-Pacific region” as the context of bilateral security coop-
eration.

Many Japanese analysts are opposed to the expansion of geographical or
functional limits of Japanese-US security cooperation citing the constitutional
ban on collective self-defense. To support their view, these analysts refer to the
1981 government statement that even though Japan possessed the right of
collective self-defense as a right recognized by international law, the Japanese
government interpreted Article Nine of the Japanese constitution as prohibiting
the exercise of that right for Japan. Accordingly, Article Five of the US-Japan
security treaty has been interpreted to give Japan the right of unilateral self-
defense (Kobe’s jerkin) within the geographical limits of the treaty but prohibit
cooperative operation with the United States beyond those limits and Article Six
has been interpreted to authorize the United States but not Japan to use facili-
ties in Japan for the peace and security of the Far East. In order words, a careful
distinction has been maintained between Japan’s self-defense and the United
States’ collective self-defense without Japanese participation.48 However, Japa-
nese critics are concerned that this distinction has been gradually eroded by the
Japanese government’s security cooperation with the United States, such as in
sea lane defense. They view the “redefinition” of the US-Japan security alliance now underway as an extension of the “interpretative expansion” of Article Nine of the Japanese constitution.\(^49\)

**Conclusions**

The sterile constitutional arguments that have long dominated the security debate in Japan are gradually giving way to discussions of broader issues involving Japan’s role in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. The change is a response, long overdue, to the serious erosion of the credibility of US security commitment in the region.

The Clinton-Hashimoto summit marked the beginning of a new era in US-Japan security alliance. Although the joint security declaration temporarily assured the world that Japan and the United States remain committed to the bilateral security treaty as the cornerstone of the bilateral relations and a linchpin of their security policy in the region, it remains to be seen whether the leaders of both countries can secure their people’s support, let alone their regional neighbors’ endorsement, for the bilateral alliance as a stabilizing force in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War.

A Japanese analyst wonders aloud whether the new US-Japan security alliance represents an effective instrument to counter the persistence of dangerous power politics in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific or an undesirable strengthening of the pattern.\(^50\) While we must await history’s verdict on this question, it is clear that the importance of the US-Japan security alliance for the Asia-Pacific will grow in the foreseeable future. Another Japanese analyst welcomes the new security relationship as a stabilizing force in the region and calls on his countrymen to discuss the specific requirements of the US-Japan alliance.\(^51\) Yet another Japanese analyst goes further and ponders the day when the United States abandons its forward deployment strategy, defines its role in the Asia-Pacific as a balancer rather than a guarantor of security for allies, and withdraws its presence in Japan. “Can Japan and the United States build a relationship of trust without a security treaty?” he asks.\(^52\)

The time has come when the Japanese intellectual community must think the “unthinkable”. The end of the Cold War has finally penetrated the analytical minds of Japan. Will the Japanese politicians and bureaucrats respond in kind? The most realistic answer today is “Perhaps”.

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\(^49\) The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, Number 4, 1997

\(^50\) The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, Number 4, 1997

\(^51\) The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, Number 4, 1997

\(^52\) The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, Number 4, 1997
FOOTNOTES


4 See, for example, Fumiaki Nishiwaki, “America no Raising Senryaku to Nihon no Anpo Seisaku” (US post-Cold War strategy and Japan’s security policy), in Masamori SASE and Satoshi Dishewater, Eds...Tenkanki no Nihon society Setae (Japan in a transitional period and the world), Tokyo: Ningen no Kagakusha, 1995, pp. 95-123.
See, for example, Kenji Suzuki, “Omoiyari Yosan’wa Nichibei Anpo no Akashi ka Onimotsu ka” (Is the “sympathy budget a proof of the Japan-US security relations or a burden?), Chuo Koran, January 1993, pp.84-93. Two hundred and fifty billion yen, or about $2.2 billion, was budgeted for the host-nation support in FY 1994.

See, for example, Jester Trachoma “Shinbei Nyua’ no Sogo Senryaku o Monometer” (In search of a comprehensive strategy for “friendship with the US and joining Asia), Chuo Koran, March 1996, p.20-38.

See, for example, Modicum Asia, “Alpo no Seisan gad Hitsuyo, Beikoku in GIGO Yameyo” (A revision of the (Japan-US) security treaty is necessary. Stop flattering the US Asahi Shim bun, October 22, 1992, p.9.

See, for example, Takehiko Kamo, “Shinrai Taikoku’ Nihon e no Michi” (The road toward a “trust power” Japan), Ushio, May 1996, pp.76-85. Kamo is critical of what he terms the “status-quothinking” that informs the Nye Report (discussed below) and urges Japan to develop a post-Cold War strategy involving broader, non-military US-Japan cooperation, engagement of China in international affairs, and multilateral private-level communications involving North Korea.

See interview with the chief author of the report, Prof. Akio Watanabe of Aoyama Gakuin University, in “Anpo o Tou” (Questioning the [US Japan] security treaty), Asahi Shim bun, June 14,1996, p.7


For this view, see for example, Edward Olsen, “Target Japan as America’s Economic Foe,” Orbis, Vol. 36, No 4 (Fall 1992), p. 496


22 Betts, p.43.


25 *Hokkaido Shimbun*. February 1,1993, p.3.


28 Ibid., p.5.

29 Ibid., p.8.

30 Ibid., p. 16.


32 Ibid. p.93-96.


Ibid., p. 110.

For a similar assessments Manning, “Future shock or Renewed Partnership?” pp.90-92.

For a similar critique of the Johnson-Keehn argument, see Ralph A.Cossa, “Johnson and Keehn’s Ossified Analysis,” PacNet. No.35 (October 6,1995).

Robert A.Manning, “Future shock or Renewed Partnership?” pp.87-98.


Among the areas identified by Manning are: improved joint military planning and joint training for a number of scenarios; improved logistics support, particularly reaching an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement; increasing interoperability in defense systems by including more cooperative development in C3 I and other areas; and sustaining host nation support. (Manning “Future shock or Renewed Partnership?” pp.94-95.)

Even in the collection of papers published as “Japan’s Strategic Priorities in the 1990s” by the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a research organization close to the Foreign Ministry, the Japanese authors present no long-term strategic vision for Japan but rather engage in largely descriptive analyses of recent developments. The one exception is Hitchhike Okazaki’s “Siren- Too in okra Kakumeiteki Hence” (Revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), but the author takes an almost fatalistic view of Japan-Russia relations based exclusively on geopolitical considerations and disallowing any serious consideration of technological and intellectual factors that may after the strategic configuration of these bilateral relations in the post-Cold War era. See 1990-nendai in okra Nihon no Senryakuteki Kadai, JJJA-IISS Kokusai Shimpoojiumu, Tokyo: Nihon Kokusaimondai Kenkyujo, 1993.
See interview with Governor Ota in “Okinawa no Maria way Hondo no Minshushugi no Chicora in Kakatteimasu” (Okinawa’s future depends on the democratic power of the mainland), *Setae*, July 1996, pp.78-87. See also Masahide Ota, “Hondo Kara Okinawa way ‘Miredomo Miezu’ nanodeshoko” (Is Okinawa beyond the mainland’s vision?), *Setae*, May 1996, pp. 153-156.

Asahi Shim bun, March 7, 1996, evening, pal.

For the same view, see the discussion between Motto Shin and Hisahiko Okazaki appearing in “Okinawa a Kokunaimondai de au” (“Okinawa” is a domestic problem), *Chuo Koran*, January 1996, pp.24-33.

The Japanese prime minister confirmed the new NDPO underscoring that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. President Clinton reaffirmed that, to meet its commitments in the prevailing security environment, the United States will maintain its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level (47,000) in Japan. Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed his government’s continued support for the US military presence in his country.

See, for example, Tetsuo Maeda, “‘Kyokuto Yuji’ to Shudanteki Jieiken” (‘Far East contingencies and the right of collective self-defense), *Setae*, May 1996, pp.192-195.

Ibid., pp. 194-195.

Takehiko Kamo, “Pawa Politicks Kara no Dakkyaku o” (Freedom from power politics), *Setae*, July 1996, pp.23-33.
