LIMITED PLAYER’S GAME: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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1. Limited players’ game (LPG)

In the theory of game the simplest one is the two players’ game, when one player can easily foresee the moves of the other one, deduce his likely strategy as the most optimal option and the outcome of the game is possible to be preordained to a certain degree. The classic example of the two player game is chess. In chess either white or black wins or draws. But chess is a typical zero sum game, where the two players adopt a strategy of “bad for the opponent means good for him”. In real life, such games never take place.

Reality is different and diverse. Two players’ games never exist in pure form and in most cases, the games are often non-zero sum games, where the players have conflicting as well as common interests and leverages may differ in great degree. Depending on the number of players and the leverage that they possess we can classify games into two basic categories for the purpose of our studies: limited players’ game and multiplayer’ game. When only a limited number of players in the game have considerable leverage, which can decisively influence the final result of the game, while others have an insignificant say, which may not be of principal importance to the final outcome of the game, such a game can be called a limited players’ game or LPG. As compared to multiplayer’ game, in LPG the interests as well as likely strategies of the parties involved may be defined more easily, thus making the forecasting of the outcome possible to a more or less precise level. Sometimes certain mathematical solutions can be applied in the calculations of LPG.

One of the solutions, applicable to LPG is the Nash solution. The Nash solution is based on the threats that both parties pose and suggests that there must be a certain level of utility for each player and that utility does not correspond with mathematical outcome.

So in 1911, when Mongolia-Russian game has started both players had different utility of the situation. In case of non-cooperation with each other worst outcome for Russia would have been loss of Mongolia as a sphere of interest, while Mongolia could lose independence. Since Russia had the biggest influence of all three players in the situation, they were able to dictate their terms. Nash solution (may be not in pure form) in this game seemed to be -Mongolian independence under Russian
influence. But Russians were playing other game at the same time with Chinese. Since the other potential players had no interest in this game in Central Asia Russia’s only opponent was China, weakened by the internal disputes. China was looking to assert its own authority over Mongolia, thus there was no room for Mongolia-China game. But Russians were playing softer to China, recognizing formal Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia in return to concessions in Manchuria, Xinjiang. In case of non-cooperation Russia could recognize Mongolian independence, which may create an unfavorable precedent for Tibet, Chinese Turkestan and Inner, Mongolia. So Russian utility in Chinese game was lower /or closer to the root/ than in Mongolian game, but stakes were higher, Russian favored more agreement with Chinese. So the final outcome was - China lost Mongolia de-facto, but was able make Russians to agree on the de-jure suzerainty, Russia made Mongolia de-facto its sphere of influence, while Mongolia had to agree to this outcome.

In general absolute Nash solution or Pareto optimality means the absolute optimal situation for all the players. The involvement of limited number of interests in LPG makes side factors to play more prominent role, whereas in the games, with participation of large number of players many counter interests of different parties diminish or nullify the effect of other factors. In LPG side factors may play greater role, at times influencing logical outcome, dictated by power relations.

For example: what should be the optimal strategy for a prisoner, who escaped from prison but is located and surrounded by police? Logically, if he fails to cooperate with police and surrender he would be killed. If he surrenders he may spend some more years in prison, but it is better than to be killed. Optimal strategy for police is not to engage in shootings, which may hurt them and to convince the prisoner to surrender. Seemingly the Nash solution is only such an outcome. But it may happen that the prisoner is not sure whether he is not going to serve even longer term for escape and resistance to police. Here the irrational strategy comes into the picture and the prisoner may decide to fight with the police to the death.

So in games with limited number of players the psychological pattern and type of perception of the parties influence the outcome of the game quite seriously.

2. Psychological patterns of the game

The decision making is done humanely and is influenced by a number of factors other than logic. Human beings make mistakes. Estimation of the possible outcomes and threats posed by the other player as well as understanding of the interest and intention of the other side may be determined wrongly, over-estimated or underestimated.
British and French leaders between the two World Wars had not been able to make correct estimation of the situation in Europe and the threat posed by Nazi Germany. The policy of appeasement adopted by the West, at the time when Germany was not strong enough militarily had given a time for Hitler to rebuild German military might. What seemed to be the right solution of crisis for them was only encouraging the ambitions of Hitler.

In LPG psychological pattern, the players play a more important role, whereas in multi-players’ game, because of the need of calculating and balancing a large number of different and counter interests the psychological factor does not play the prominent role. In the United Nations, the decision making is not usually influenced by the gambling of one country and is usually balanced by the interests of a number of other countries. In case of bilateral negotiations if one side applies some moves dictated not by the logical calculation of leverages, it will have to be accounted for. Also in multiplayer’ game a player has more sources of interaction to weigh his decision in a particular situation: seeing the reaction of first, then the second player possesses the possibility to make corrections into his course of action thus limiting possible psychological over or under-reaction. In LPG the possibility of such corrections is limited, since any move is immediately answered by a counter move starting with the next level of interaction.

Psychological patterns in any game differ in their manifestation and influence. The player, gambling for more favorable outcome, sometimes may put at stake too much, threatening to turn the outcome of the game negative for both. When there is an awareness that he is likely to loose as a result of the game and his leverage is not sufficient to change the outcome of the game, a so called inferior psychological pattern develops. Depending on the scope of inferiority complex, the moves of player are determined. The superiority complex is formed vice versa. Whether the party acts generously or aggressively depends on a number of factors, including the psychological pattern.

If poor man and rich man are given 1000 dollars to divide between them, but in case of disagreement nothing is given, the definite psychological disadvantage develops in the mind of poor man. Since even small amount is more precious to the poor, if rich man does not agree at the equal share of the sum, poor man may agree at the smaller amount because he has to lose more in case if sum is lost due to their disagreement. Whether the poor mail agrees at one third or one fourth or one fifth of the total sum does depend on the leverages that both parties have and psychological patterns of both parties. Rich man is not averse to gambling since his utility is equal to the sum involved, while poor mail is averse to gambling because his utility is equal to the root of the sum involved. So the poor man may be as happy with 250 dollars as with 100 dollars.
Creation of certain types of psychological patterns is dependent on the amount of leverage and utility of the players as well as national character and historical heritage. The Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese negotiations during the Cold War certainly had different psychological patterns. The psychological aspect of the game is felt utmost in a crisis situation. Often decision making level does not command the sufficient time to analyze the critical situation that arises and due to shortage of time the decision making is restricted to the limited number of officials, thus making the human error more likely and creating possibility of psychological over or under reaction.

Reactions of different states to particular situations differ, depending on their system of values and ideologies. Revolutionary states act in different manner as the status-quo states: they do perceive their goal as well as character of the game differently.

Roosevelt’s perception of post-war Soviet Union was of the responsible actor and he was engaged in the normal bargaining process about the post-war world system. While for Stalin both Nazi Germany and United States were the same adversaries, though varying in the degree. So Stalin never believed in the US President’s speech about peace.

The psychological pattern or behavior of a player usually affects strategy that he chooses. An interesting observation to this effect was made by the British biologist John Maynard Smith. He suggested the existence of different types of behavior such as “dovish”, “hawkish” and “bourgeois”. Psychological patterns in real life differ in variety, and theoretical behaviors of “doves”, “hawks” or “bourgeois” do not exist in pure form. Revolutionary or ideological states tend to act more hawkish, while status-quo states tend to act dovish.

If the player in the LPG chooses a strategy other than the logical one, depending on psychological factors, it immediately affects the final outcome of the game. Sometimes the player’s strategy may look irrational, but any decision making at any given time, space and circumstances is influenced by the psychological environment, the empirical estimation of his chances, the system of values, beliefs and ideology as well as level of information that he possess.

The psychological patterns do not necessarily play a decisive role and often result in a variety of solutions around the Nash solution. Sometimes when the inferior party is aware of possible disastrous outcome he may decide to go for extreme gambling, threatening the failure of the game and thus bargain more. Whether his move really changes the outcome of the game does depend on his leverage in game.
Should the Czech Government have decided to show extreme resistance on the eve of the Munich Agreement, threatening to counter Nazi Germany militarily, the possible outcome of negotiations might have been little different. Britain and France would have been forced to pressurize Hitler more, while Germany at that time had not enough resources to counter military confrontation on the both sides. More or less the same situation occurred in 1915 when Russia and China (both were not in position to afford military hostilities) were trying to force Mongolia to submit its newly declared independence. The rigid position of the Mongolian representative forced the hands of Russians, but as a final result Mongolia had to accept Chinese suzerainty, while staying de-facto under Russian protectorate.

But the study of psychological patterns is interesting because in LPG importance of any move of a player grows, sometimes beyond the logical set-up of circumstances. States are supposed to act rationally in a given situation, since each state has its own national interest and it is far beyond its psychological attachments or inclinations. It is proven from history that in similar circumstances reactions of different states were different and the different strategies they followed were connected with the decision making of the ruling elite, political traditions, ideological pursuits etc.

Psychological pattern of Mongols

Mongols are the reminiscence of the super-ethnic creation of the XII century.

In the XII century two powerful ethnic groups were formed in East Asia. The tongues tribe of Churchmen’s successfully defeated the Liao Empire and created the Ching Dynasty on the Chinese territory. At the same time Mongols had become a strong force. So called “men of long will” appeared among Mongols, and became a foundation for of a strong system of administration, laid down by Chingis Khan. After a series of successful battle, Chingis Khan was able to unite most of the nomadic tribes of Central Asia. Already in XIII century Mongolia became a kind of super-ethnos, caimans, keratins, man guts, talents and a number of other tribes, some of them speaking Turkish languages were identified as Mongols. Despite different customs, sometimes different languages, all these tribes were common in their allegiance to Mongol princes and assisted them to conquer almost the whole of the known world. In the Golden Horde, Tsagadai Horde and II-Khanids Hordes the Turk language became a medium of communication and many of the conquerors accepted Islam, due to the prevailing Turk-speaking Islamic population.

Except China, where the massive peasant uprising rooted out the Yuan Dynasty, almost in all places Mongol nobility was accepted as part of the socio-cultural sphere and gradually assimilated other civilizations. In time, the ethnic units,
earlier identified as part of Mongolian super-ethnos, started identifying themselves more with Turkish super-ethnos rather than Mongolian. Possible reasons of Mongolian super-ethnic identity are the gradual process of settling down of these nomadic ethnic groups and decline of Mongol supremacy. The settled tribes, separated with the Mongol rulers, started accepting the values of the local civilization, thus gradually identifying themselves more with the local civilization. Super-ethnic processes such as the spread of Islam gradually separated the united identity of nomads. Central Asian nomads have divided into two basic identity groups—Muslim and Buddhist.

Mongols thus have feelings of the bearers of great tradition of the past, which are relevant or at least were relevant not only to the Mongol-speaking peoples.

Other important aspects of the psychology of Mongols were determined by geographical factors. The Eurasian steppes due to the extreme climate and biological set up were basically suitable either for cattle breeding or hunting. The Altai Mountains blocking the way of western monsoons and Khingan range blocking the way of eastern monsoons made the steppe region dry. The extreme climate of the region predetermined the character of nations living in this area. The life of a Mongol was always a battle for life or death. The extreme cold of winter, the extreme heat of summer made the nomad Mongols to adapt to the everyday battle for life. Never ending battles with different Chinese Dynasties, where the outcome of defeat was not simple subjugation but disappearance of the nation, as well as their own internal clashes made Mongols to get used to the military life. The great steppe region was never subjected to Chinese occupation for a long time, while in similar conditions many nations bordering with China have disappeared or been assimilated (churches, machos, tubas, tan guts etc.) and in some cases physically destroyed.

The will of Mongols for freedom was the savior from constant foreign domination. From the II century BC up to the modern times the tribes in the great steppe region were conquered mostly by the same nomadic tribes. These ruling tribes after conquering China gradually assimilated with Chinese and became more Chinese rather than “barbaric nomads”, but that is a different story.

Mongols have a strong sense of statehood. The Great Empire of Chinggis Khan, leaving its deep scars in the history of the whole world, has left the deep allegiance to the idea of a Mongolian State, the legitimacy and strong sense of statehood.

In 1911, 1921 as well as in 1990 most Mongolian leaders were deriving inspiration from the great legacy of the past, thus making nationalistic sentiments the driving
force of movements. After two centuries of foreign rule, when at least three generations were brought up in the colonial age, not only Mongol nobility who had led the 1911 Mongolian nationalistic movement but also the masses were inspired by the idea of a Mongolian state. The idea of a United Mongolian State was so strong that Mongol nobles in 1912 stated to the Russian delegation that it would be better for Mongolia to disappear than getting freedom at the cost of Inner Mongolian brothers’ plight. The glory of the past and legacy of Chinggis Khan may explain the Mongol military campaign in Inner Mongolia and broad acceptance of the idea of pan-mongolism or unification of all Mongols.

Mongols lack the psychology of the small player. The Era of Pox Mongolia has left a considerable bearing on Mongolian social thinking. Mongols founded the Greatest Empire in the history of mankind.

For many centuries, the Mongol cavalry was the undisputed military leader in the vast territory from Pacific coast to the Adriatic. The introduction of rifles and the dominance of infantry over cavalry, has restricted the Mongol influence first over the world and then in regional affairs. Mongol Dynasties were either overthrown or considerably weakened in most of the former satrapies by the XY1 century, but Oirads, Halhas and Eastern Mongolian Khanates were still the dominating force in the affairs of Inner Asia. The Russian advance to the East was successfully checked by the Mongols and instead of south-east Russian drive went towards the east up to the Pacific coast. This fact shows that the Mongols either still were the significant military force to challenge Russia or still believed that they were. Even when the Eastern Mongolians lost the battle to Machos in 1636, Halhas in 1680 Mongol Khanate in western part - Dzungaria was formidable force in the international relations in Inner Asia, conquering the Eastern Turkestan and at times posing serious threat to Manchus.

Mongols have no experience of dealing with small players. From the days of Pax Mongolia till today Mongols never dealt with small countries. Thus Mongols never had the experience of behavior as a small player. Only by 1911, rudely forced by Russians and Chinese to accede independence, Mongols felt that they had become an insignificant force and their words could be ignored.

Perhaps that is the reason why Mongols never voluntarily degraded themselves to an insignificant power. Even after the independence in 1911 and realization of the fact that they were negligible toy in the hands of great neighbors; Mongols did not give up their efforts. Mongol negotiator in Khyanta negotiations was behaving so rigid on the question of independence that both Russian and Chinese Governments had to pressurize Mongolian Government to replace the man with more assertive person.

That may explain the reason why Mongolians used to address always the great players whenever their questions of security and independence came.
Using one great power to check the advance of another one was probably the only alternative at that time, when the small players were never taken seriously in the international relations, but at the same time this strategy coupled with psychology of following the strongest, often led to the undisputed domination of that power in Mongolian affairs. Sovereignty was at stake in such a game and Mongols had to accept greater control of the “friendly power” in their internal affairs. Russia and China were always the most important players and Mongols tried to involve the other great players unsuccessfully. The only attempt to bring into the game an insignificant player-Tibet (1915 Agreement) - was of no visible significance.

Mongols have the psychological pattern to follow the strongest. This pattern is developed by the course of development Mongolian history right from the XIII century, when the unified Mongol Empire was founded.

All state systems, established in Mongolia before the Great Empire had pattern of the union of tribes: Strongest chieftain, who prevailed over the others, established a kind of suzerainty over the other tribes, but the privileges and authority of the defeated chieftains were left untouched in most cases or fugitive chieftain was replaced with a more loyal relative. Due to the low level of population and pastoral cattle breeding system, more often the leader lacked the possibility to control totally the defeated tribes and it was safer to make the chieftain to swear allegiance to him and leave him at the head of the tribe (because he possesses the legitimate authority over the tribe and due to the lack of enough pastoral lands the new leader could not physically settle the defeated tribe near to his tribe). Allegiance to the sovereign was a strong one and breakage of such allegiance by the nomadic etiquette was punished severely by death and the tribe dissolved in the other victorious ones.

From this period Mongols had developed the psychology to follow the strongest. Chinggis Khan, who made drastic changes in the succession system of ruling of tribes (he awarded titles not by birth, but by merits) was not able to change this psychology, developed by centuries.

From “The Secret History of Mongols” such a psychology may be traced easily: Different Mongol tribes were joining either Chingis or Jamuha side, depending on their rise to power. In the successive centuries Mongol tribes started following the strongest in the clan of Chinggis Khan. The same psychological pattern has played a role in the subjugation offal Mongolia to Manchu rule in 1680. Mongol nobles in Dolonnuur had to choose between Galdan Boshigtu of Western Mongolia, who was already in possession of the Central Mongolian territory and Manchu rulers. They have chosen Manchus, a tribe of different linguistic origin but of the same realm, who offered the continuation of their privileges. Manchus at that time were the
same nomads, with more or less the same traditions and customs and same script. For Khalkhas it was one of the downs in their history, when they had to take refuge in the umbrella of the stronger ruler against the other one. Halha units have participated in the elimination of the Western Mongolian Dzungar Khanate. Halha princes and noyons continued to seek approval of their succession from the Manchu Emperors. All these facts show that the Halha nobles did not see a big difference between the Western Mongolian rulers and Manchus: for them the Manchu emperor was another suzerain of the same realm.

In 1911 when Mongolia claimed independence from Manchu Empire, Mongols have chosen the strongest player in the field. Russia as their ally may be not be the strongest player by the psychological pattern but by the absence of any other choice. When, during tripartite Khyahta Agreement, the suzerainty of China over Mongolia was recognized, Mongols started pondering whether their choice was the right one. This might be the reason why in 1920 the Mongol nobles discussed the question of whose assistance should be sought to repel the Chinese, Japar and the other imperialist powers have come into the discussion.

3. The case of Mongolia: Limited players’ game

The case of Mongolia from 1911 onwards presents the case of the limited players’ game. The history of Mongolia after the disintegration of the Great Mongolian Empire was a LPG with involvement of Chinese Ming Dynasty, Manchus, Oirat Mongols (Western Dzungar Khanate), Halha Mongols, Eastern Mongols and Tibet. Starting from the XYII century when Russians came to the Mongolian border, Ming Dynasty ceased its existence being conquered by the Machos and subsequently different Mongolian player lost freedom. Since 1911 always there were three players Russia: (Tsarist Russia or Soviet Union), China (Manchu Chin Empire, Republican China, and Communist China) and Mongolia. The leverages that two greater players possess in the game were differing at times, but not principally: Russia always enjoyed more supreme power, while China has acquired more leverage from time to time. Mongolia was always the smallest player of the game.

The geographical location and international situation of that time were such that the other players capable to play more prominent role were of insignificant influence in case of Mongolian game. Great Britain was far beyond the Himalayan Mountains and preoccupied by its Indian empire. Japan was yet to grow to come into the stage and the USA pursued isolationist policy. Any attempt to bring any of the other players into the picture would have meant more
gambling than serious adventure, while the outcome of such Endeavour might have meant alienation of powerful players.

At times two major players were playing none zero sum games (1911) and at times zero sum games (1921 and 1960s). At times games were cooperative, at times non-cooperative. But the truth is that the Mongolian square was always one square in the major chessboard between two players and at times the outcome of the Mongolian game was pre-determined by the other moves on the other side of the chessboard. The interest of the smallest player in the game was not generally taken into consideration, though certain basic moves had to be made by both players to satisfy the smallest player.

**a) 1911 game**

In 1911 after the dismantling of the Manchu Empire Mongolia declared independence. The new Mongolian state was not in a position to ensure its independence by its own means and the Republican China laid claim over Mongolia as a successor of the Manchu Empire. Russia was one of the active players in the international relations in the Far East and had definite political as well as economic relations in Mongolia.

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<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Non-zero sum game cooperative</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Non-zero sum game cooperative</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Zero sum game cooperative</td>
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For this type of situation it was only logical that the Mongols would look for the alliance with Russians against Chinese. Russians were regarding the Chinese claim over Mongolia unfavorably and in the larger game for the sphere of interest, Mongolia was one of the bets. Winning Mongols on their side and given the inability of the Chinese to settle the matter by military means, Russians got the strong leverage in the larger -game. The Chinese knew that Russians were not likely to give away Mongolia easily. Russians and Mongols were playing a cooperative game with each other; Chinese and Mongols were playing a non-cooperative game. Mongols had to choose their strategy virtually from the “lesser of the two evils”, since choosing China as a cooperative partner
would mean the loss of independence and opposing it would mean a conflict. Seeking for a third partner, which does not have a significant leverage, would mean that balancing player Russia is lost as a partner, but the conflict with China is inevitable and actually there was no other interested player.

**Table of Mongolian Strategy vies a vies two major players**

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<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>following</td>
<td>obtain a partner</td>
<td>lose independence</td>
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<td>opposing</td>
<td>lose a partner</td>
<td>conflict</td>
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<td>seeking for the third partner</td>
<td>lose a partner</td>
<td>conflict</td>
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Russians were interested to secure their interest in Mongolia, but in the interest of the larger game they were not prepared for conflict over Mongolia with Chinese or let Mongols go for conflict with China. Since independent Mongolia was not the interest of Russia and Russia did not need a buffer between it and China (in fact Russia was already in North China), the Russian strategy was to secure its economic interest in Mongolia and de-facto supremacy. Mongols were not easy and quiet subjects, the question of integrating them into Russia was too early and unacceptable either by Chinese nor by Mongols, and Russia could not afford hostility on the eastern border. The question of letting them into Chinese fold would not secure Russian interests but alienate Mongols. Thus the maximum gain for Russia in any strategy adopted was to win Mongolia as their sphere of influence. Russians understandably chose the strategy of minimum risk. The solution to which Russia came was to recognize the formal Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia, while keeping Mongolia under its own sphere of influence.

**Table of Russian strategy vies a vies Mongolia**

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<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
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<td>full support of Mongolia</td>
<td>conflict</td>
<td>full cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>opposition to independence</td>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>loss of Mongolia</td>
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<tr>
<td>no full support, but no opposition</td>
<td>negotiations over the sphere of influence in Mongolia</td>
<td>forced cooperation</td>
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Since China was engaged in the kind of zero-sum game in Mongolia and any question about independence of Mongolia was ruled out, thus the possibility of cooperation of Mongols, they had to decide over the strategy vies a vies Russians only. Chinese started playing a cooperative game with Russians because the total loss of Mongolia would question the Chinese authority over Tibet, Xinjiang and other national minority regions, thus they were loosing more. Mongols were not likely to be cooperative with them given the China’s claim of legitimacy of sovereignty over Mongolia. They could not afford Military campaign against Mongols: on one hand, Russians would not approve it and throw their lot on the Mongols’ side and on the other hand, Chinese were fighting with Mongolian military units for years in Inner Mongolia without decisive success. Certainly the best strategy was to play cooperative game with Russians to make sure that the loss is less. Eventually they had to accept the Russian solution.

Mongols literally were forced to accept the solution: opposition to the Russian Solution would mean the end of Russian support and face to face conflict with China, which it could not afford. Dragging another player in the game (Japan for example) was not possible on one hand (already East Asia was divided into the spheres of influences) and on the other hand would yield little.

The stiffness of Mongols, sometimes even to the extent of irrational behavior, had played its own role in this game: Both Russia and China had to make certain concessions to the smallest but troublesome player, leaving the practical attributes of an independent state. Mongols still had their Emperor, capital city and counting” of calendar era.

b) 1921 game

In 1921 the game was the same from the power point of view. Soviets having gained still more superior power, Mongolia was asking their assistance and China was in turmoil and not able to carry out military solution. But in 1921, a new factor came into existence. Soviet Russia was ideologically committed to world revolution and revolutionary Mongolia had much more appeal in Kremlin eyes. Not much economic interest was perceived in Mongolia, but the interest of setting an example for the “oppressed people of the East” was much more important. In 1921, Russian military units entered into Mongolia and with their assistance Mongolia was declared independent. Perhaps original Mongolian leadership in 1921 had no big plans of converting the country into communism’s show piece or never had full understanding of what communism is. They “agreed”
to the Soviet system in return for independence but soon found that they had to sacrifice for independence not only the socio-economic system, but also a considerable part of population. Comintern agents started training Mongols to build communism in the country.

The best illustration of the Soviet Russian policy toward Mongolia, mixed with ideological pursuit and geo-strategic considerations, is expressed in the letter of Eliava to Stalin. He wrote: “The Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) has multiple importances for us.

1. The existence of people’s revolutionary government in the MPR is important for converting the country into the “experimental field” of non-capitalist way of development in colonial underdeveloped countries.

2. It is a natural barrier for our eastern borders stretching over 3000 kames from Manchuria to Chinese Turkistan.

3. The MPR is an important supply basis for meat and other raw materials for USSR.

4. If the war will start in Manchuria or Far East the only possible instrument to interact with Chinese would be Mongolia”

Accession of Mongolia into Russia was out of the question again, Mongols, who invited Russians, were still more nationalists than communists. Traditionally Mongolia was not part of Russian Empire and wide cooperation for total Russian rule was not expected. Moreover China would react bitterly to such a step and the fact that in 1924 Soviets recognized again the suzerainty of China over Mongolia showed that Russians still had to consider Chinese reaction seriously. Mongolia remained a nominally independent country under the Soviet sphere. By the 1930s, the authority of the Mongolian government was only nominal. Russians were in fact controlling everything.

The game was different in the other sense that the question of third player was totally out: theoretical unity of Mongols and Soviet Russia did not permit any other player. If anyone tried even to think of it out loud he was immediately declared as a spy of imperialism and should be executed. Soviet Russia could gain more from independent Mongolia: it could serve as an example of Bolshevist theory of self determination and communist revolution. With the growing menace of Japan, Mongolia could serve as buffer zone. Chinese were not likely to allow a third major player in the game: only real player was Japan, which tried to organize the Pan-Mongolian independent state in 1919.

China had little leverage to change the situation: in the 1920s it was in turmoil; in the 1930s Japanese landed in Northern China and its own independence was under question let alone Mongolia. Ultimately in 1945, the Chinese
had to recognize the independence of Mongolia under the pressure of the Soviet Union.

Mongolia had little choice in the game: Chinese were still playing a zero sum game, claiming their sovereignty and there was no other player in the field. When Japan came into the picture Mongolia was already deep into the Soviet sphere and hardly any question of game had arisen. Mongols had to accept de-facto control of Russians for the nominal independence.

In this stage, psychological pattern of Mongols changed drastically: Soviets actively penetrated into the social thinking of Mongols imposing communist values. On only one question was almost all Mongolian leadership unchanged - the question of independence, irrespective of how nominal it was. Soviets had to take into account this part of the psychology of Mongols: they never seriously considered the accession of Mongolia into Soviet Union.

c) 1949-1960s

With the formation of the People’s Republic of China Mongolia found itself in a new situation. Now all three players were playing a cooperative, non-zero sum game. Moreover there was ideological unity between all three players. Communist China recognized Mongolia as an independent country. Russia needed the “Chinese card” in the situation of American monopoly of atomic weapons. With two major players showing favorable attitude toward Mongolia, at times “competing in their assistance to the building of socialism” in Mongolia, Mongols gained the as most players in the game. It was still in the firm Soviet control, but the question of open competition did not arise.

Perhaps Chinese communists were still having deep belief in their minds to “win Mongolia back”, but to do it openly was not possible and not acceptable to the other players.

It seems that there was hardly any influence of psychological pattern in this period, except unanimous decision of all Mongols to assert their independence in 1947, which was recognized by Republican China and Communist China. Perhaps there was a wish on the part of the Mongolian leadership to enhance its influence in Inner Mongolia, but it was never really attempted. Neither the Mongolian leadership had the ability and decisiveness to carry out such a task, nor did the USSR have plans to encourage such move.

d) Sino-Soviet drift

With the Cultural Revolution in China and Mao Test Dung’s rise to power, the two players started showing more hostile attitudes to each other. The border
clashes between the two resulted in military confrontation.

The character of the game was changed. Now two major players were playing a non-cooperative, zero sum game, which left little room for Mongolia to operate. Russia needed Mongolia as a buffer between itself and China. The Russian military force stationed in Mongolia from 1966 was a serious threat to China. Mongolia was required to be a showpiece of the non-capitalist way of development in the third world.

Mongolia again followed their traditional partner, for that matter the strongest player again. Perhaps even if there was a possibility of choice they would have still chosen Russia, since whether China would still consider Mongolia as an independent country was under suspicion and Russians were in control of Mongolia.

China started regarding Mongolia as a satellite of “Soviet revisionists”. The “map war” started and Mongolia was renounced by Red Guards.

e) 1980s and 1990s

In the mid-1980s, the perestroika started in Russia. The Russians started to restructure the relationship in the Far East from a different angle: they needed to reduce the level of military confrontation and to use the saved resources for the reconstruction of the economy. They started mending fences with Chinese. The pragmatic communists in China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping were not averse to the cooperative game with Russians. In the Vladivostok speech, Russians signaled that they are ready for pull-out of military contingent in Mongolia and soon the withdrawal started. By the beginning of the 1990s the whole situation in Russia was out of control and the Mongolian game was beyond the attention of the Russian leaders. After the Yeltsin’s rise to power, Russia started to look into Mongolian affairs again, but the situation drastically changed.

Mongolia experienced a democratic revolution: democratic governance was introduced and communism renounced. There was no question of earlier military strategic cooperation between the two parties and Russians most probably were not interested and not able to play the earlier game. But the basic interests of good-neighbor relations remained the same. Mongols were still interested in two major players as counterweights against each other’s domination. China continued its policy recognizing Mongolia’s status as an independent country. Perhaps the game that China is playing now with Mongolia can be termed as a cooperative game. The treaty of 1960 was renewed and economic cooperation has continued.
Table of Character of the game and interests of the players

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<th>Russia</th>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>cooperative game</td>
<td>reduction of tension</td>
<td>zero economic burden</td>
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<td>look out for new market</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>cooperative game</td>
<td>reduction of tension</td>
<td>to win over economic</td>
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<td>military hardware</td>
<td></td>
<td>influence</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>restoration of ties</td>
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The military component of the game has diminished significantly and the economic content of the game moved to front stage. The temporary disruption of Mongolia’s economic ties with Russia had not resulted in the tilt towards China. Chinese had done little in the sense of development in Mongolia and could not replace Russia as a subsidy-giver, as many Mongols might have desired.

Mongolians are trying to balance the situation by adding a new player in the game. Attracted by the Western attention to the changes in Mongolia, Mongols tried to woo the West in the game. The USA was openly named in the Mongolian newspapers as a third neighbor and relationships with countries like Japan, South Korea and India are being actively developed.

4. The question of the third player

Introduction of the third player in the game is one of the options for Mongolians to get out of the vicious circle of pre-determined outcome games.

The Concept of National Security of Mongolia refers: ... In foreign relations, exercise political realism and consistently principled approach, according top priority to the vital interests and other national considerations, and seek to secure many partners in international relations. ... Promote the policy of consultation with influential countries on issues of strengthening world peace and security, of developing international cooperation, of enhancing countries strategic significance and fostering strategic interests of major powers in Mongolia.”
Mongolia was able to attract the attention of Western countries by its peaceful transition to democracy and comparatively successful economic experiment into a market economy.

After the Cold War the situation in the international arena changed drastically. It is hard to suggest a military aggression from China or Russia in order to control Mongolia which they never not attempted at the zenith of their influence, but it is also equally hard to suggest a country, which will come to the rescue in the face of such an aggression. Perhaps the era of military confrontation is over but it does not mean that there no such possibility in the future. In case of internal upheaval in any of neighboring countries Mongolia might be subject to external encroachment. In the new situation in and around Mongolia the role of the new player is supposed to be more as an engine for further socio-economic development of the country.

There we could name a few of players capable to get engaged in the game.

1. The United Nations and other international bodies will play an important role. The world has institutionalized substantially and single-handed action against sovereign states is not common for principal actors of international relations. Already the UN system is actively engaged in the question of economic development of the country.

2. Western countries could play an important role in any game on Mongolian soil or its surroundings.

3. Newly independent Central Asian republics may constitute a base for certain united zone of states, where Mongolia could play its own role.

The psychological pattern developed from the years of the Cold War was still felt in the country, making many people feel insecure by the absence of “security umbrella”. As we have stated earlier, given the international status of Mongolia and the fact of recognition by its two neighbors of its independence, the direct military aggression by two neighbors seems unreal (though Iraq-Kuwait conflict demonstrated that in the case of military confrontation with neighbors Mongolia, lacking its own dependable defense resources, would face a “Hobson’s choice” Situation).

The absence of internal interest groups as well as communal or religious contention is an important asset. The democratic institutions in the country are set and well defined, political stability is guaranteed to a reasonable level.

Perhaps the most important sphere of activities for the Mongolian Government would be economic development. The economic collapse of the post-democracy era may result in the discontent of the population. The above mentioned countries may play the role of the “third factor”, enabling Mongolia to
overcome the negative effects of the economic crisis. The Mongolian strategy is to keep open its doors for the international community in order to get the necessary resources required for its development.

FOOTNOTES

1. Britannica, Macropaedia Vol. 19, pp. 644
2. John F. Nash assumed that a game had a set of possible solutions and that associated with each outcome was a utility for each player; and a unique outcome that satisfied four conditions: 1. Solution must be independent of the choice of utility function 2. It must be impossible for both players to simultaneously do better than Nash Solution (Pareto optimality) 3. Solution must be independent of irrelevant alternatives 4. Solution must be symmetrical. Ibid. pp. 646


5. John Maynard Smith in his book “Evolution of behavior” has suggested that males in biology behave either like “hawks” or “doves”. Hawks starts fighting immediately, but it envisages more lethal outcomes thus harmful for the population. Doves posture awhile and retreat before any harm is done, but all dove populations will be vulnerable to external invasion. But the “bourgeois” behavior, male fighting fearlessly in case a rival is met on his territory and retreating in case of others territory.

6. L.N.Gumilev “Etnogenez I biosphere semi” pp. 214
8. First historical reference to the nomadic identity is traced from II BC, when the Hun Emperor Molding concluded a treaty with Han Emperor Kaotsou in 198 BC. The treaty recognized that tent dwellers beyond the White Wall/Great China Wall/ are under Shayne’s/Hun Emperor’s title/jurisdiction rend hat and belt bearers to southward of the Wall are under Han Emperor’s jurisdiction.

10. Ibid, pp.413