Rethinking International Cartel Enforcement: Institutional and Legal Responses in Developing Economies, with Evidence from Mongolia

Abstract

Cartels are widely recognized as one of the most harmful forms of anti-competitive conduct, often described as the “supreme evil” of the economy due to their capacity to distort markets, suppress competition, and reduce consumer welfare. While significant progress has been made in domestic cartel enforcement, the regulation of international cartels remains fragmented, particularly from the perspective of developing economies.

This article examines the challenges faced by small and developing countries in addressing cross-border cartel conduct, including limitations in evidence collection, institutional capacity, and access to international enforcement mechanisms. It reviews seven major approaches proposed in the literature, ranging from global institutional solutions to private enforcement and cross-border cooperation mechanisms, and evaluates their feasibility using Mongolia as a case study.

The analysis demonstrates that proposals requiring high levels of international political and economic consensus are unlikely to be implemented in the near term. Instead, more practical and context-sensitive solutions emerge as viable alternatives. These include strengthening domestic enforcement capacity, leveraging foreign decisions as evidentiary tools, enabling follow-on private actions, developing parent-company liability within corporate law, and integrating competition-related provisions into bilateral and regional economic agreements.

The article argues that, in the absence of a binding international framework, developing economies must rely on a combination of domestic legal innovation and strategic international cooperation. By adopting flexible and realistic mechanisms tailored to their structural constraints, such economies can enhance their ability to combat international cartels and mitigate their adverse effects on domestic markets.